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
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Military Contingency Operations: The Lessons of Political-Military Coordination

ADB006030

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Final report 6 June 1975



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This thesis investigates the utility of conventional military intervention by Western powers in achieving their short-term foreign policy aims. Through a survey of the literature of political-military coordination, case studies of contingency force interventions, and comparative analysis of the interventions, factors fundamental to successful contingency operations are developed.

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THE LESSONS OF POLITICAL-
MILITARY COORDINATION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1975

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the utility of conventional military intervention by Western powers in achieving their short-term foreign policy aims. Through a survey of the literature of political-military coordination, case studies of contingency force interventions, and comparative analysis of the interventions, factors fundamental to successful contingency operations are developed.

The study finds that many contingency force operations have succeeded in attaining short-term foreign policy objectives. Operations designed for overt coercion have been less successful than interventions to defend territory or support friendly governments. Situational constraints in operating directly against hostile powers and incurring risks of escalation to nuclear warfare are found to be important elements in overall failure. Clear definition and careful coordination of tactical and strategic military objectives were required in successful defensive and stability operations. Precise delineation of military objectives was not necessary to achieve coercion through deployments of forces; however, once these forces engaged in active combat operations, military success was a necessary but not sufficient precondition for overall success. Future contingency forces will need additional capabilities to deploy sizable armored forces to achieve coercion and defense objectives.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The importance of military force has been a central feature of modern international relations. Superpowers have staved off major conflict with each other through the continuous presence of threats of mutual annihilation, legitimized as deterrence. The superpowers have also intervened elsewhere. Sometimes the interventions have been overt, with uniformed military forces; often the interventions have been covert or indirect, with military aid, training, advisors, or espionage and subversion. Regional powers have fought brief violent wars or waged protracted struggles to further their own national interests; and over three decades these regional conflicts have involved increasingly modern and destructive weapons. The threat of nuclear proliferation is fast approaching reality. Even within states violence has become a way of life. The tensions of modernization and external pressures, often exacerbated by subversion from abroad, have severely taxed the domestic political structure in many societies, and a resort to arms has been the inevitable consequence.

Nothing in the immediate future seems likely to change the importance of military force. In particular, the nation-state seems likely to remain the primary actor in the inter-

national system. Advances in communications and the integration of the world economy seem, paradoxically, to have generated increased national consciousness at the same time that the breakup of the old colonial empires has flooded the world community with a multitude of new states. To be sure, many international organizations have emerged, but in the central issues of the territorial integrity and the security of nation-states, the states themselves seem likely to remain their own final guarantors. As many theorists have suggested, issues of national security are too important to be left to international organizations, and the successes of these international organizations have occurred largely in the absence of vital national issues.

The future seems to hold significant areas of potential conflict within the nation-state system. The integration of the world economy has escalated many formerly minor concerns to the status of vital national issues. For the US the problems of energy are representative of this tendency. Worldwide tensions over the distribution of goods, resources, and accumulated wealth will probably intensify. These tensions will be fed by a widespread anti-Western outlook perhaps derived from the anti-imperialist ethic of many of the new states. And underlying the new tensions of the "haves" versus the "have-nots" will rest the fundamental conflict of interests of the two superpowers. From this amalgamation of tensions, little hope remains that the world will see any significant decline in the importance of force in inter-

national affairs.

But the questions remain for the US, what sorts of military forces are to be preferred, and how ought these military forces to be employed? Certainly almost three decades of competition with the Soviet Union have won public acceptance of the need for some sort of nuclear forces to maintain deterrence from a direct attack upon the US. (Of course the composition of these strategic deterrent forces arouses considerable public debate.) Also, most of the public would apparently accept some forces stationed on the European continent to preserve the credibility of the American commitment there. (Though again the size and composition of these forces is debatable.) But far more controversial in the long term will be conventional, general purpose forces designed to be employed in some unforeseen contingency. For what contingency could such forces be usefully employed? How large must such contingency forces be, and how should they be equipped and trained? Will the maintenance of contingency forces increase the probability that the US will become involved abroad in areas of less than vital concern? Surely, in the years to come, it is these general purpose, uncommitted forces which will receive the most intense public scrutiny and will generate the least public support.

The issue of the utility of contingency forces is of utmost importance to the US' foreign and military policies. The contingencies for which these general purpose forces might be designed are likely to occur all too frequently in

the future. While the chances of strategic or central war with the Soviet Union seem remote, the likelihood of progressive deterioration of US interests in more peripheral areas is quite high. In the Middle East, in South and Southeast Asia, even in Latin America, the prevailing tide seems not to be running in line with what the US perceives as its long-term interests. And a near continual series of short-term disorders seem to present themselves as challenges to American concepts of international peace and stability.

Many Americans seem to accept on faith that the military capabilities of the US constitute a court of last resort in securing American interests abroad. Witness, for example, the persistency with which the possibilities of military seizure of Arab oilfields have been discussed. Even more dangerous has been the tendency of many to seek reliance on the threat to use force; the credibility of that threat is of course dependent upon the utility of actually employing forces in contingency operations. If contingency forces are to be useful, then some guidelines to their use are vital; if they are not likely to be useful, they constitute a squandering of precious resources and perhaps even a provocation by their very existence.

This paper addresses the utility of US contingency forces. Specifically, it evaluates the attainment of national objectives by Western contingency forces during the period 1950-1965. From the case histories of several contingency operations, the characteristics critical in deter-

mining success or failure are developed. These characteristics are then projected into the immediate future to provide certain guidelines for effective structuring and employment of contingency forces.

The study assumes throughout a realistic view of international affairs. The same conflict and competition characteristic of the past are presumed to be inevitable in the future. Maintenance and employment of contingency forces are assumed not to exercise any decisive influence, through what some writers have called "the institutionalization of violence;" on the competitiveness of the international system. International intercourse will continue to depend, in large measure, on various forms and degrees of coercion; contingency forces will represent one instrument of that coercion.

Because this study deals with the relatively brief period from 1950 to 1965, the effectiveness of contingency forces has been examined only for the short-term. Their utility in advancing long-term goals, if these be considered distinct from the short-term objectives, is beyond the scope of this study.

This study is limited to contingency operations - interventions -involving conventional military forces. Other forms of intervention, including the provision of military training and equipment, are beyond the scope of this paper.

The remaining chapters of this thesis examine in

issue introduced above. In Chapter II the literature on the use of military power to attain national objectives is surveyed. Chapter III explains in detail the methodology of the investigation. In Chapter IV seven contingency operations involving conventional military intervention are described and analysed. Chapter V summarizes the findings of the historical investigation and suggests the applicability of the historical findings to present circumstances.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Problems of coordinating military operations with political objectives have been recognized for thousands of years. Scores of writers have contributed to the dialogue of military strategy; the volume of writings has been especially great in the past three decades. Specialized fields such as deterrence and crisis management have blossomed.

To deal effectively with the literature of political-military coordination, this chapter focuses on the works which have best developed the themes relevant to contingency force operations. It is not a comprehensive but rather a representative review of the literature. Karl von Clausewitz' tract On War established the fundamental inter-relationship between military actions and political aims which has gained increasingly wide acceptance today. American strategists Henry Kissinger and Robert Osgood advanced American understanding of the importance of limited war and other military commitments which sought less than absolute destruction of the opposition. Thomas C. Schelling extended the analysis of the political utility of military forces by investigating the coercive employment of military power. Coercive diplomacy was further analyzed by Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons in light of the American

engagement in Vietnam. And, faced with the difficulties of the Vietnam conflict, other writers such as William R. Fox and Paul Keckskemeti explored further the problems of conflict termination.

Clausewitz - The Synthesis of
Military Strategy and Politics

Systematic investigation of the theory of military intervention began with the writings of Karl von Clausewitz in the Nineteenth Century. Clausewitz established three fundamental precepts of war which have remained as the cornerstones of intervention theory. In the first place he posited that the military methods and objectives of any campaign must be subordinate to the political ends for which the campaign has been initiated. In Clausewitz' words,

War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to do our will....War is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means....(The) political view is the object, War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.¹

Clausewitz thus established war as merely another act along the continuum of diplomatic intercourse. While war was seen to be subject to imperatives derived from the nature of absolute violence, war must nevertheless be viewed as an integral part of the pattern of interstate relations; war must be subordinate to the political aims of the state. Clausewitz took great effort to explain that wars must not be left to the military to plan; rather, the objectives and methods of war must be the most vital concern of national

political leaders.²

In viewing war as an integral part of national policy Clausewitz was led, secondly, to the idea of limited war. Wars need not necessarily be fought to the total devastation of one side or the other; indeed, to do so might be irrational. As Clausewitz explained,

War does not always require to be fought out until one party is overthrown; and we may suppose that, when the motives and passions are slight, a weak probability will suffice to move the side to which it is unfavorable to give way....

As war is no blind act of passion but is dominated by the political object, therefore the value of that object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased. This will be the case, not only as regards extent, but also as regards duration. As soon, therefore, as the required outlay becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value, the object must be given up and peace will result.³

Only this idea that war might be halted short of the complete destruction of one side or the other allowed war to be viewed as an integral part of national policy; wars which threatened the very existence of the belligerents would soon escape the control of political leadership. In essence, Clausewitz had established that the political objectives in war ought usually be limited to something less than the total destruction of the opposition.

How then ought military power be directed in order to achieve the political aims of the war? Again, Clausewitz' answer provided the foundation from which later theory has developed. Clausewitz noted that there were three general possibilities for military objectives: the military power of the enemy, the territorial integrity of the enemy, or

the enemy's will to combat.⁴ Clausewitz felt that the most important objective must be the will of the enemy. As he stated, "War cannot be considered at an end so long as the will of the enemy is not subdued also...."⁵ Furthermore, attacks upon the will of the enemy offered promise of victory even when the destruction of the enemy's military power or occupation of his country was impossible.

We see, therefore, that in wars where one side cannot completely disarm the other, the motives for peace on both sides will rise or fall on each side according to the probability of future success and the required outlay. If these motives were equally strong on both sides, they would meet in the center of their political differences. Where they are strong on one side they might be weak on the other. If their amount is only sufficient, peace will follow, but naturally to the advantage of the side that has the weakest motive for its conclusion.⁶

Now, were the other side convinced of this beforehand, it is only natural that he would strive for this probability only, instead of first wasting time and effort in an attempt to achieve the total destruction of the enemy's army.⁷

In his emphasis upon the enemy's will as the prerequisite for victory Clausewitz struck upon the notion that has underlain all later intervention theory.

In descending below the level of grand strategy, Clausewitz was concerned with the objective of the war. Though there might be many means of attaining this objective the primary method was to destroy the armed forces of the enemy.

The aim of War in conception must always be the overthrow of the enemy; this is the fundamental idea from which we set out.

Now what is this overthrow? It does not always imply as necessary the complete conquest of the enemy's country.

All that theory can say here is as follows: That the great point is to keep the overruling relations of both parties in view. Out of them a certain center of gravity, a center of power and movement, will form itself, on which everything depends; and against this center of gravity of the enemy, the concentrated blow of all the forces must be directed.

In states torn by internal dissensions, this center generally lies in the capital; in small states dependent upon larger ones, it lies generally in the Army of these Allies; in a confederation it lies in the unity of their interests; in a national insurrection, in the person of the chief leader, and in public opinion; against these points the blow must be directed.

But whatever may be the central point of the enemy's power against which we are to direct our operations, still the conquest and destruction of his Army is the surgest commencement, and in all cases the most essential.

Though Clausewitz did not contend that the only means to achieving a favorable outcome to the war was the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, he believed that their destruction would be the surest path to a successful outcome.

But how is the enemy's armed force to be destroyed? Clausewitz observed that there existed several means of destroying the enemy's forces, but that the surest means to their destruction was to engage and defeat them in a climactic battle.

The destruction of the enemy's armed force is the means to the end....The only means of destroying the enemy's armed force is by combat, but this may be done in two ways; (1) directly, (2) indirectly, through a combination of combats. If therefore battle is the chief means, still it is not the only means. The capture of a fortress or a portion of territory is in itself really a destruction of the enemy's forces....⁹

But as Clausewitz emphasized,

This destruction of the enemy's force must be principally effected by battle.

Only great and general battles can produce great results.

The results will be greatest when combats unite themselves into one great battle.¹⁰

For Clausewitz, then, war was chiefly a matter of bringing the enemy to battle under conditions in which decisive destruction of his armed forces could be achieved.

Although there are many important observations in Clausewitz' work, none of his tactical ideas stand out so clearly as the need for mass.¹¹ Not only must the armies raised be large, but they must also be kept concentrated.¹² These large armies must maneuver to strike the enemy a concentrated and decisive blow then pursue the routed army until it is destroyed.

The synthesis which Clausewitz created between war and politics was largely ignored by other theorists in Nineteenth Century Europe.¹³ Rather, these men seized on his prescriptions for the military itself, the arguments for battles and mass. From Clausewitz' explication of his extremely complex ideas, it was but a short step to Poch's dictum, "Modern War knows but one argument: the tactical fact, battle."¹⁴ There ensued in the West a separation of military art from the overriding political constraints and objectives which has not been fully bridged to this day. And for the extension of Clausewitz' ideas in the West one must turn to the American debates on national strategy of the 1950's.

Kissinger and Osgood - The Strategy
of Limited War

In 1954 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles an-

nounced the US strategy of Massive Retaliation. This strategy explicitly rejected the maintenance of US capacity to defend the free world through local military actions and instead called for reliance on the deterrent element of massive retaliatory power, to be delivered against the enemy by the means and at the times and places of our own choosing. The strategy perpetuated the American tendency to view war and peace as two fundamentally dichotomous states.

In the aftermath of the Korean War and DienBienPhu, the new strategy provoked an immediate debate. The controversy swept through the foreign affairs community of the United States; many analysts participated in it, with articles appearing in many scholarly and popular journals. However, two books, both appearing in 1957, contained most of the digested analyses of the strategy and also served as the springboards from which the follow-on strategy of Flexible Response was developed. These books, Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,¹⁵ and Robert E. Osgood's Limited War, The Challenge to American Strategy,¹⁶ also mark the continuation of Clausewitz' analyses of the theory of political-military coordination.

Both Kissinger and Osgood felt that Massive Retaliation was simply unworkable. The most likely risk was not of an all-out Soviet attack on the US but of limited attacks or subversion around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet sphere of power. And in attempting to counteract these advances the power of massive retaliation would be ineffectual. As Kis-

singer explained,

Given the power of modern weapons, a nation that relies on all-out war as its chief deterrent imposes a fearful psychological handicap upon itself. The most agonizing decision a statesman can face is whether or not to unleash all-out war; all the pressures will make for hesitation, short of a direct attack threatening the national existence. And he will be confirmed in his hesitations by the conviction that, so long as his retaliatory force remains intact, no shift in the territorial balance is of decisive significance. Thus both the horror and the power of modern weapons tend to paralyze action: the former because it will make few issues seem worth contending for; the latter because it causes many disputes to seem irrelevant to the overall strategic equation. The psychological equation, therefore, will almost inevitably operate against the side which can extricate itself from a situation only by the threat of all-out war. Who can be certain, faced with the catastrophe of all-out war, even Europe, the keystone of our security, will seem worth the price?

As the power of modern weapons grows, the threat of all-out war loses its credibility and thus its political effectiveness. Our capacity for massive retaliation did not avert the Korean War, the loss of northern Indochina, or the Suez crisis.¹⁷

Osgood reached a similar conclusion in surveying the results of US aid to the French in Indochina in the early 1950's.

One major lesson of Indochina, like the lesson of Korea, is that unless we have the will and capacity to support local defense by limited war, our ability to drop bombs on China and the Soviet Union will not be sufficient to contain Communism in areas which we are unwilling to defend at the cost of total war.¹⁸

The limited wars which Kissinger and Osgood envisioned were US military interventions; they were to be distinguished from the traditional American scheme of war by four features: limited objectives, firm political direction, flexible military capabilities, and proper public support.

First, limited wars must be fought for limited objectives. As Osgood noted,

Clearly, the overall strategic objective of containment requires that the specific political objectives for which the United States must be prepared to fight limited wars will not entail radical changes of the status quo. The very fact that the war remains limited although the belligerents are physically capable of imposing a much greater scale of destruction assumes that neither of the belligerents' objectives constitute such a serious challenge to the status quo as to warrant expanding the war greatly or taking the large risks of precipitating total war.¹⁹

The risk of not limiting the political objectives was, of course, the risk of expansion to a nuclear war which might threaten the existence of civilization. If local defense was to provide any viable alternative to the threat of massive retaliation and all-out war, then political objectives of the intervention had to remain limited. Of course, the enemy must understand that US political objectives were limited.

Civilian political direction of military forces was seen to be vital. As Kissinger observed,

Limited war presents the military with particular difficulties.... Since the military can never be certain how many forces the opponent will, in fact, commit to the struggle and since they feel obliged to guard against every contingency, they will devise plans for limited war which insensibly approach the level of all-out conflict.

From a purely military point of view they are right, for limited war is essentially a political act. Its distinguishing feature is that it can have no purely military solution. The political leadership must, therefore, assume the responsibilities for defining the framework within which the military are to develop their plans and capabilities.... The prerequisite for a policy of limited war is to reintroduce the political element into our concept of warfare and to discard the notion that policy ends when war begins or that war can have goals distinct from those of national policy.

In other words, military objectives and methods should not be selected solely with an eye for their consequences, or the

armed forces of the opponent state. Rather, the formulation and implementation of military actions must be carefully coordinated to support the fundamental political objectives for which the nation entered the war. All of this, of course, is distinctly Clausewitzian, yet it represented for both the military and national policymakers a great departure from traditional American attitudes and experience.

US military forces must be flexible enough to wage war at all levels of violence in any part of the globe. This flexibility required both a new doctrine and an expanded capability to wage war at the sub-nuclear level. Military power must still be capable of achieving the most rapid and complete destruction of the enemy in an all-out war, but for limited wars the military must be able to apply graduated amounts of destructive power for limited objectives and with appropriate pauses for political discussions. In limited war military operations had to be conducted in discrete phases which permitted the opportunity for both sides to assess risks and possibilities for settlement before escalating to the next phase of military operations.²¹ New weapons systems would be required for limited war, too. Total war required weapons systems designed to inflict maximum destruction in minimum time, while limited war required highly mobile weapons systems which could be moved to trouble spots to bring their power to bear with discrimination.²² Both writers felt that the US then lacked both doctrine and weapons to wage limited war successfully.

Finally, a policy of limited war required discrete support from the public. Certainly the public must understand the rationale for the limited war, and the public must tolerate the employment of forces in less than an all-out effort. But the public must also refrain from the jingoism which might exacerbate the intrinsic tendencies of any conflict toward escalation. A degree of public understanding not previously demonstrated in the US would be required to engage successfully in limited wars.

Neither writer developed in any depth the particular relationships between military objectives and the political ends to be attained. Both writers acknowledged that it was difficult to make explicit analyses of military objectives and limitations prior to the actual initiation of the war. In fact, this was one of the fundamental problems of limited war.²³ Thus both writers tended to emphasize general characteristics of a military doctrine rather than clear guides to that doctrine.

Nevertheless, some fundamental points on the inter-relationship of military and political objectives did appear. In the first place both writers emphasized that the primary function of the military operation was to affect the enemy's will to continue the fight. As Kissinger stated,

...(limited war) represents an attempt to affect the enemy's will, not to crush it, to make the conditions to be imposed seem more attractive than continued resistance, to strive for specific goals and not for complete annihilation. In a limited war the psychological equation will be of crucial importance, not only with respect to the decision to enter the war but throughout

the course of military operations.²⁴

Osgood explained that military effectiveness in limited war was to be measured not only by its effect on the physical capabilities of the other side but also by the political and psychological consequences of military measures, and the relation of these measures to the ability of the US and the enemy to continue to generate resources for the war.²⁵ It was apparent from the thrust of these concepts that objectives which had military value in affecting the enemy's capabilities might have to be measured against their psychological, political, and economic effects: implicit also was the reverse, that engagements which might have little military effect might be of momentous consequence due to their psychological, political, or economic impacts. It was clear also that to some degree the limitation and direction of military measures to obtain maximum impact must be guided heavily by assumptions about the enemy's character and motivations.

A second thread of the interrelationship between the military and political objectives was explored by Kissinger: the influence of the threat of escalation upon the conduct of limited war. Kissinger's basic premise was that the threat of escalation would serve to limit the war, for the loser could convincingly threaten to escalate unless he achieved more favorable results while the winner's threat to escalate over an already limited objective would seem less credible. Also, the more secure that the winner felt about the mili-

tary outcome as was, the less likely it would be to test the determination of its opponent to escalate the conflict.²⁶ The implications of this line of reasoning were twofold. First, since limited engagements would not inevitably escalate to general war, limited war was a feasible policy option. Second, forces committed to an operation need not overwhelm the enemy completely; rather, US nuclear forces would serve as a brake on escalation. US conventional forces would be merely the "price of admission;" they would initiate the risks of escalation to nuclear war which would halt the enemy's attempts to alter the status quo. Hence, US forces required for limited warfare might be somewhat lower than they would need be if not analyzed in relation to the risks of all-out war. Of course, different types and quantities of conventional forces could be required in various circumstances.

The concept of limited war (military intervention) which both writers espoused was essentially defensive. It was to be exercised when deterrence failed, when the communists attempted to circumvent the limits of strategic nuclear deterrence. And, with their emphasis on US deficiencies, they were more involved in establishing the requirements for a policy of limited war than in articulating precisely the nature of the limited war policies which ought ultimately emerge.

Schelling- The Diplomacy of Violence

The next steps in the development of the theory of

military intervention were taken by the many writers who contributed to the ideas of crisis management and competitive risk-taking. Among the field Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence,²⁷ published in 1966, best incorporated the many facets of political-military coordination as they were understood prior to large-scale US involvement in Vietnam.

Schelling's fundamental point was that there were really two uses of military force. The first was to employ brute power to seize terrain or some other objective. The second use was to generate pain, to cause hurt. As Schelling noted,

The usual distinction between force and diplomacy is not merely in the instrument, words or bullets, but in the relation between the adversaries - in the interplay of motives and the role of communications, understandings, compromise and restraint. Diplomacy is bargaining....

With enough military force a country may not need to bargain. Some things a country wants, it can take, and some things it has, it can keep, by sheer strength, skill, and ingenuity. It can do this forcibly, accommodating only to opposing strength, skill, and ingenuity and without trying to appeal to an opponent's wishes. Forcibly a country can repel and expel, penetrate and occupy, seize, exterminate, disarm, and disable, confine, deny access and directly frustrate intrusion, or attack. It can, that is, if it has enough strength. "Enough" depends on how much the opponent has.

There is something else though that force can do. It is less military, less heroic, less impersonal, and less unilateral; it is uglier and has received much less attention in Western military strategy.... Military force can be used to hurt. In addition to taking and protecting things of value, it can destroy value. In addition to weakening an enemy militarily, it can cause an enemy plain suffering.

The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy - vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.²⁸

And it was the use of military power coercively, to hurt an

opponent, upon which Schelling directed his attention.

The power to hurt may be exercised either by the actual use of military force or by the threat to use military force. In any given case, Schelling implied, the decision to use force rather than to threaten to use force should depend upon several factors including the credibility of the threat, the bargaining positions of the respective parties, and the risks entailed by the use of force.²⁹ But regardless of the particular form of coercion attempted, the coercion was seen to be both more versatile and more complicated than the brute use of force.³⁰ To generate coercion the coercer must know, as a minimum, the values of the opponents; he must communicate his own demands to the opponents; and he must share some common interests with the opponents.³¹ The range of common interests need not be great; a desire on both parts to reduce losses or end the war might be sufficient to produce a successful termination if coercion were appropriately applied. Naturally, this coercive employment of military violence would require extensive coordination with political aims and constraints.

Schelling distinguished two fundamental types of coercion, deterrence and compellence. These were logically distinct; deterrence aimed to prevent an opponent from acting by threatening him with certain consequences. The onus of initiating the consequences was designed to rest with the opponent. Compellence aimed to force an opponent to act in a certain manner by taking positive action to coerce him.

These actions might be merely threatening, or they might involve the actual application of force.³²

In practice the difference between deterrence and compellence was not so clear; it might be a difference of timing or degree. Compellence usually involved initiating an action, whereas deterrence usually involved merely setting the stage or the trip wire and waiting.³³ Compellence usually required a threat with definite timing; deterrence tended to be indefinite in its timing.³⁴ A compellent threat was usually less easily connected (by the threatened party) with the desired response than a deterrent threat. As Schelling explained,

In a deterrent threat the objective is often communicated by the very preparations that make the threat credible. The trip wire often demarcates the forbidden territory. There is usually an inherent connection between what is threatened and what is threatened about. Compellent threats tend to communicate only the general direction of compliance, and are less likely to be self-limiting, less likely to communicate in the very design of the threat just what, or how much, is demanded. The garrison in West Berlin can hardly be misunderstood about what it is committed to resist; if it ever intruded into East Berlin, though, to induce the Soviet or German Democratic Republic forces to give way, there would be no such obvious interpretation of where and how much to give way unless the adventure could be invested with some unmistakable goal or limitation - a possibility not easily recognized.³⁵

In some cases there might be little discernible difference between compellence and deterrence, as when one wished to deter an enemy from continuing to do something he had been doing, or when the deterrent threat must be made lively to become credible.³⁶

Since deterrence and compellence both entailed ele-

ments of threat, they shared some common characteristics. Both threats required that the opponent be given assurances that if he acceded to the threat, he would be spared the consequences of refusal.³⁷ In both cases some degree of connectedness was required between the threatened act and the demands of the threatening power to communicate the threat and to show the limits of the threat.³⁸ And in both cases the threat may be comprised of elements of actual pain to be inflicted or risks of higher levels of pain to be inflicted. As Schelling noted, the coercion would depend more on the threat of what was to be done than on the damage already done.³⁹

Despite the similarities of the two concepts of coercion, the impact of Schelling's distinction between deterrence and compellence was clear: compellence justified the actual employment of force in limited ways to obtain purely diplomatic, not military, ends. The doctrine thus represented an extension of the concerns which Kissinger and Osgood had earlier expressed about the need to develop means to prevent the artificial separation of conditions of peace and conditions of war. As Schelling explained,

War no longer looks like just a contest of strength. War and the brink of war are more a contest of nerve and risk taking, of pain and endurance. Small wars embody the threat of a larger war; they are not just military engagements but "crisis diplomacy"....

Military strategy can no longer be thought of, as it could in some countries in some eras, as the science of military victory. It is now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation, and deterrence. The instruments of war are more punitive than acquisitive. Military strategy, whether we like it or not, has become the diplomacy of violence.⁴⁰

The translation of these broad strategic principles into specific military objectives and methods was considered briefly by Schelling for wars at the sub-nuclear level.

First, he distinguished between the "tactical" and the "diplomatic" effects of violence at the tactical level.⁴¹

Since he was primarily concerned with the use of force to coerce, he concentrated on the diplomatic effects of violence.

The basic problem at the tactical level appeared to be generating coercive pressures without escalating the conflict.

Coercion could be facilitated if tactical actions were clearly "connected" with the demands of the coercor or the aggravating actions of the opponent.⁴²

The intent of the coercing power should also appear unambiguous.⁴³ Not surprisingly, Schelling favored carefully measured, discrete doses of tactical violence to communicate coercion to the opponents.

At the same time that coercion was being applied, the opponent must be made to understand the limits of the demands of the coercor. These limits could be communicated through the military actions of the coercing power if military actions were clearly restricted as to targets or weapons. The most effective communication of restraint would result from restrictions of what Schelling termed the all-or-none variety, for example, no nuclear weapons.⁴⁴ Implicit limits might also emerge in the threshold between phases of escalations; these limits would also communicate restraint and the threat of greater violence later on.⁴⁵ The sum of

these strictures implied that tactical objectives and methods would be carefully constrained from above and that objectives and methods would be chosen for their diplomatic rather than their military impact.

Finally, Schelling noted that tactical violence must not overwhelm the vulnerable aspects of the enemy. Some power must be held back to promise more terrible pain if the opponents do not accede to the coercor's demands.⁴⁶ Also, hostage elements of the enemy must be kept viable to receive this threat.⁴⁷ The message for the tactical military commander, then, was that he would not be allowed to deal decisive blows against the enemy's forces, economy, or other targets.

In the light of recent American diplomatic successes Schelling's thoughts seemed to promise a more humane, less dangerous, and certainly a cheaper method of using military forces.

Coercive Diplomacy - Techniques and Termination

Writing with the perspective of the early 1970's, Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons added more analysis to the theory of intervention. In their book The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy⁴⁸ they identified four strategies for the use of violence: quick and decisive violence (Schelling's brute force); a strategy of attrition; a test of capabilities with very strict ground rules (they cited the Berlin Crisis of 1948 as an example); and coercive

diplomacy.⁴⁹ George, Hall, and Simons then concentrated on the problems of coercive diplomacy by examining the cases of Laos, 1961, Cuba, 1962, and Vietnam, 1954-64. They distinguished two types of demands which could be exerted by coercive diplomacy: the demand for the enemy to stop what he is doing, and the demand for the enemy to undo something he has already done.⁵⁰ Both seemed to be variants of Schelling's concept of compellence. The authors noted that there were two strategies of applying coercive force; these were the try-it-and-see approach, which involved step-by-step gradual intensification of pressures against the enemy, and the ultimatum approach, which set a specific demand and date for compliance. Naturally, the latter was more dangerous to apply but promised better results.⁵¹

The authors identified eight factors which enabled the US to apply successfully the strong variant or ultimatum approach to coercive diplomacy. These factors were the strength of US motivation, an asymmetry of motivation in favor of the US, the clarity of US objectives, a sense of urgency by the US, usable military options, the opponents' fears of escalation, and some clarity concerning the precise future terms of settlement.⁵² Even if all these factors were present the authors foresaw great difficulty in coordinating the implementation of coercive diplomacy.⁵³ However, the difficulties attendant to implementation were not so grave, in the views of the authors, as to negate the desirability of employing coercive diplomacy when the appropriate

factors were present.

But as the war in Vietnam seemed to drag on indefinitely, without apparent progress, other writers turned to a detailed examination of the problems of terminating military interventions. William R. Fox, writing in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, noted that it took two powers to make peace.⁵⁴ Conflicts could not end short of total destruction of one belligerent unless both sought termination. Yet the conditions of limited war might not encourage either of the warring states to seek peace. The major power, embroiled in a contest of prestige with the smaller state, might become afflicted with what Fox termed policy paralysis, unable to alter either its objectives or its methods despite the apparent ineffectiveness of current policies.⁵⁵ On the other side the smaller power, perhaps committed only "not to lose," may be favored by both the tactical environment and the political pressures to hold out for a more favorable settlement. These factors did appear troublesome at the time of Fox's writing, 1970, but no solution was readily available. Rather, both powers must expect any negotiations to take a long time, and they must try to initiate negotiations early in the conflict.

Paul Keckskemeti also investigated the problems of conflict termination in light of the American intervention in Vietnam.⁵⁶ By his analysis war termination occurred when the belligerents agreed to accept the current military situation as the basis for future political payoffs. Whether

the military outcome would be accepted or not depended upon whether the belligerents viewed the present military situation as alterable in their favor with the resources remaining to them, and secondly, whether the belligerents felt that the stake which they had already in the war justified the added costs of trying to change the current military situation. Keckskemeti noted that the more ideological the conflict was, the greater were the political stakes for the belligerents themselves. He concluded that the final measure for the success of the termination was whether the postwar relations thus established were durable, that is, whether the underlying issues upon which the conflict was based were actually resolved through the engagement. Thus military curtailment of hostilities would not actually mean successful war termination.

Conclusion

The literature of intervention provides only general indicators of the proper relationships which must hold between military tactics and strategy and national political aims. All writers were aware of the difficulty of reconciling the military exigencies of actual combat with the political requirements intrinsic to the purpose of the military operations. Military actions must be successful, by their own standards, if they are to support national policy, but they must not be so successful as to escalate national objectives or hinder conflict termination. Military actions must imply the threat of further escalation without pro-

voking further escalation.

It is precisely the relationships between the military necessities of intervention and the political aspects of intervention at which this study is directed. To obtain further clarification of these relationships, the case histories of several interventions will be analyzed using the methodology discussed below.

Notes - Chapter II

¹Roger A. Leonard, A Short Guide to Clausewitz on War (New York: Capricorn Books, 1968), pp. 41, 57.

²Ibid., pp. 213-216.

³Ibid., pp. 61-62.

⁴Ibid., p. 60.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 61.

⁷Ibid., p. 60.

⁸Ibid., pp. 208-209.

⁹Ibid., pp. 184-185.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 151-152.

¹¹Ibid., p. 112.

¹²Ibid., p. 119.

¹³Peter Paret, "Clausewitz and the Nineteenth Century," in The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 29.

¹⁴Quoted in Leonard, op.cit., p. 20.

¹⁵Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957).

¹⁶Robert E. Osgood, Limited War, The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

¹⁷Kissinger, op.cit., p. 115.

¹⁸Osgood, op.cit., pp. 223-224.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 238

²⁰Kissinger, op.cit., p. 121.

²¹Ibid., pp. 131, 189.

²²Ibid., pp. 130-131.

²³Ibid., p. 130, and Osgood, op.cit., pp. 235-239.

- ²⁴Kissinger, op.cit., pp. 120, 139-140.
- ²⁵Osgood, op.cit., p. 242.
- ²⁶Kissinger, op.cit., p. 140.
- ²⁷Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
- ²⁸Ibid., pp 1-2.
- ²⁹Ibid., pp. 36, 3, 103.
- ³⁰Ibid., p. 8.
- ³¹Ibid., pp. 3-4.
- ³²Ibid., pp. 70-71.
- ³³Ibid., pp. 73-74.
- ³⁴Ibid., p. 74.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 73.
- ³⁶Ibid., pp. 78-79.
- ³⁷Ibid., p. 74.
- ³⁸Ibid., p. 87.
- ³⁹Ibid., p. 172.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., p. 34.
- ⁴¹Ibid., p. 152.
- ⁴²Ibid., p. 87.
- ⁴³Ibid., p. 145.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., p. 132.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., p. 156.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., p. 143.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., p. 173.
- ⁴⁸Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971).
- ⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 16-20.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 22-23.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 27.

⁵²Ibid., p. 216.

⁵³Ibid., p. 231.

⁵⁴William R. Fox, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 392, November, 1970.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 8.

⁵⁶Paul Keckskemeti, "Political Rationality in Ending War," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 392, November, 1970.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The fundamental problem in examining contingency force operations is to develop a methodology which is both comprehensive enough to provide valid generalizations and sufficiently specific to afford guidance below the level of national strategy. The methodology developed in this chapter has been developed to meet this difficulty.

This chapter addresses the methodological problem in four sections. First a rational decisionmaking model, linking national political aims to tactical military operations, is presented. This model directs attention to critical areas in investigating political-military coordination. Next, the hypothesis and some key definitions are delineated to focus research. The third section discusses the particular methodology of collecting and comparing data of actual intervention operations. Finally, some limitations of the research methodology are discussed.

The Rational Model

In the basic Clausewitzian formulation military violence is purposeful; it is instrumental in attaining the objects of the war. But, in Clausewitz' view, there existed two levels at which military means and objectives required

coordination: the tactical level and the strategic level.

The distinction in these two levels was explained by

Clausewitz as follows:

The conduct of war is therefore the formation and the conduct of fighting. If the fighting was a single act, there would be no necessity for any further subdivision, but the fight is composed of a greater or lesser number of single acts, complete in themselves, which we call combats...and which form new units. From this arises the totally different activities, that of the formation and conduct of these single combats in themselves, and the combination of them with one another with a view to the ultimate object of the War. The first is called tactics, the other strategy.

Tactics is the theory of the use of military forces in combat. Strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the object of the War.¹

Later writers have recognized that all elements of a nation's power must be coordinated with its military power to achieve the national objectives. They have added the term grand or national strategy to denote the coordination of all the elements of national power - economic, diplomatic, military - to achieve national objectives.


Based on this categorization of ends and means, one can establish the general framework of investigation. Imagine a hierarchy of decisionmakers (or decisionmaking agencies), each pursuing some objectives within the available methods and capabilities. At the highest level the national leader selects the national objectives and decides what capabilities and methods will be used. If the national leader decides to employ military power, then the national military command authorities must assign strategic objectives, allocate forces, and specify methods or constraints for the designated military units. The lower military com-

manders must translate the strategic objectives into tactical objectives for their units, allocate forces, specify constraints, and so on, down to the lowest tactical units, to focus precisely the energy of the military forces on the national aims. At each level, of course, there may be one or more objectives, perhaps somewhat conflicting, which will have to be reconciled with available capabilities and allowable methods. Also, these lower-level military activities must be in concert with other elements of national power.

This decisionmaking concept can be portrayed as a set of triangles, shown in Figure III-1 below, with each decisionmaker attempting to employ his capabilities in methods which will best accomplish his assigned objectives in coordination with other elements of national power.

Of course, this conceptual model does not fully depict real world behavior. The model assumes a rational decisionmaker or decisionmaking agency at every level; it requires an hierarchy of purposeful beings carefully assessing methods and capabilities at their levels to best satisfy the objectives directed from above. Obviously, a nonrational or irrational decision - product of accident or anger - would not be explained by this model. Many decisions arise fundamentally from the decisionmaking or consensus-generating processes within groups; these decisions, too, would lie outside the explanatory framework of the conceptual model.

The hierarchical linkage of decisionmakers which the



Legend:

- DM Decisionmaker
- ↔ Constraints, tradeoffs, adjustments
- ⇒ Tasking, guidance, direction
- Coordination required

Figure III-1

National Political-Military Decisionmaking Model

model portrays may also be an oversimplification. In some cases top decisionmakers have managed to retain effective personal control far down into an organization in times of crisis.

Further, the focus on decisionmaking implies that the decision itself is the critical element in determining success or failure. But many splendid decisions have run afoul of unforeseeable events or mishaps.

In sum, the model has definite limitations as an explanatory paradigm for exploring the historical uses of military forces to achieve national ends. This approach will not explain why forces were, in the past, committed, or why, when they were committed, they behaved as they did. And yet the limitations of this model for explanatory purposes are its strengths in directing analysis of how military forces may be useful in the future.

The assumption of rationality - of propter hoc ends-means calculations - provides the only basis on which to transfer historical experiences to contemporary situations. Only by searching for the purposeful interrelationships of policies and methods can the experiences of the past be transformed into lessons useful in guiding future policy. The goal of any decisionmaker must be to allocate perfectly the available means to achieve the desired ends; this model directs our attention exactly toward that rational calculation.

The problem of the hierarchical linkages is espe-

pecially critical in evaluating the applicability of military force. Military organizations are composed of multiple layers of decisionmakers; this layering intrinsically generates great possibilities for misunderstanding. Communications difficulties are compounded by the stresses of combat and, increasingly in the future, the capabilities of electronic warfare. This problem is critical with ground combat forces engaged in limited warfare because, as experiences in Vietnam showed, tactical units may perceive significant advantages in escalating the levels of violence or the decisiveness of objectives while strategic decisionmakers may seek to minimize violence and prevent final destruction of enemy forces.

The concern with the decisionmaker is appropriate, then, at all levels, for at the national level, US decisions to employ forces in peripheral areas, outside Western Europe or clear and urgent threats to national survival, will require the most careful consideration.

Thus this simplistic model has significant value in determining how military forces have been used to achieve national objectives in contingency operations and in exploring the constraints which will direct future US activities in these areas.

Hypothesis and Definitions

Using the model described above, this thesis will establish the following hypothesis: an examination of military actions in overseas contingencies will show that tac-

tical objectives and methods can be chosen to support national strategic aims in certain circumstances. More specifically, the paper will demonstrate the following: first, that military actions have been successful in achieving national objectives in overseas contingencies; second, that certain factors common to the successful situations can be inferred to have determined the successes; third, that application of military force within the identified constraints may be useful in certain future contingencies.

Military actions are defined to be deployments of armed forces overseas for the purpose of exercising armed coercion or violence. Excluded from this investigation are both humanitarian missions and show-of-force mobilizations not involving the actual dispatch of troops. Humanitarian missions are essentially non-coercive. Show-of-force mobilizations have been excluded from consideration because their success or failure is derivative from the expectation of the actual deployment of forces in contingencies. If the actual deployments are infeasible, then the show-of-force mobilizations will be ineffective.

Tactical objectives and methods are the parameters by which military operations may be described. Objectives portray the immediate purposes for which the forces are dispatched; methods describe the techniques and limitations by which military force is applied. Military capabilities are considered as situational constraints in planning operations but are fixed in the short term.

Overseas contingencies are crises abroad which require at least the consideration of a response by military intervention with conventional forces. This investigation is concerned with contingencies in the so-called peripheral areas outside Central Europe, Japan, and North America - the Middle East, Southeast and Northeast Asia, and Latin America.

National strategic aims are defined to be the national objectives which the intervening power hopes to secure. These objectives may be diplomatic or political in nature, as opposed to the strategic military objectives which are usually related to enemy forces, terrain, deployments, or in some instances police-type objectives such as the maintenance of public order.

Certain circumstances may allow the effective employment of military contingency forces. However, this investigation does not seek to show that military forces will be useful in resolving every problem confronting US foreign policy. Rather, it attempts to determine the parameters which must be met for the use of contingency forces to be considered desirable.

The term military intervention is used to denote the deployment of military forces into overseas crisis areas. These intervention forces are called contingency forces; they may or may not be committed directly into or against the opposing state or groups.

Data Development

Three general problems developed in acquiring data for the study. First, particular contingencies had to be selected for analysis. Second, certain similar factors within each contingency had to be discussed and analyzed. Third, some means of comparing data from various contingencies had to be developed.

Literally hundreds of conventional military contingency operations have been carried out in the international arena over the past several centuries. The scope of these operations has varied from a few score soldiers to hundreds of thousands; the results have ranged from overwhelming success to dismal failure. However, in order to draw inferences applicable to the US in the last quarter of the Twentieth Century, several criteria were stipulated in selecting criteria for analysis. These criteria are presented and explained in Table III-1 below. Criteria included the time, intervening power, opposing power, location, and information available.

By using the criteria stipulated above, seven contingencies were selected for analysis. These were Korean War (1950-53), the Anglo-French invasion of Suez (1956), US intervention in Lebanon (1958), British deployment to Kuwait (1961), US deployment to Thailand (1962), US intervention in Vietnam (1964-65), and US deployment to the Dominican Republic (1965). These contingencies ranged from long-term commitment to limited war to short term deploy-

ments of ground forces not requiring actual combat. They covered geographic areas from Latin America to the Far East and ranged from interventions in allied states to interventions in hostile states.

Table III-1
Criteria for Selecting Contingencies

| Criterion | Rationale |
|---|--|
| Post-1949 | Contingencies conducted under the influence of superpower bipolar competition in a nuclear environment. |
| Intervention by US or Britain | Leadership norms and public acceptance of military action are likely to be highly significant in the future; previous US and British experiences provide the most accessible and possibly most relevant guides in this area. |
| Intervention not directly against Soviets | Interventions against the Soviets are likely to be dominated by the threat of nuclear war and will follow a different dynamic than interventions against other opponents. |
| Interventions not in colonies | Major power control over colonial governments and the demise of colonial status reduce the applicability of lessons derived from these experiences. |
| Adequate information available | No use of classified data was permissible. |

The rational political-military decisionmaking model indicates that the crucial factors which demand assessment in each contingency are the coordination and compatibility of the objectives and methods within the capabilities and

constraints at each of the decisionmaking levels. To assist in analyzing these factors the following specific questions were asked of each contingency operation. How were the military objectives to support national objectives? How well were military objectives and methods coordinated with other aspects of national power? How feasible was the attainment of the military objectives? How did military capabilities interact with the development of national plans and/or military objectives and methods?

After the narrative analysis of each contingency was completed the various factors involved in each contingency were assigned abstract evaluations so that they could be compared against each other. The factors to be evaluated were derived from a compilation and synthesis of considerations developed by the various theorists of political-military coordination. It must be emphasized that these evaluations, and the rationale by which they are justified, do not constitute formal hypotheses. Indeed, some of these factors were derived by theorists examining the very contingencies investigated in this study. Rather, these factors are to be used strictly in the descriptive sense, as aids to cataloging and comparing the important aspects of the contingency operations.

Four general areas of each contingency were evaluated and assigned rankings. These general areas were national objectives, situational constraints, military objectives and methods, and policy coordination factors.

The various objectives of contingency operations are

felt to have significant impact in determining the characteristics and requirements for success. Though national objectives were often extremely complex and ambiguous, this study categorized each contingency operation by its primary, secondary, and tertiary purposes as defensive, support or stability, coercive, or seizure.

Certainly the various situational factors present in contingencies exercised strong influence on their outcomes. The six situational factors selected for comparison were the location of the intervention, the nature of the opposition, military capabilities of the intervening state, inconsistency of intervention with previous policies, lack of public support for the intervention, and the risks of escalation. The rationale for selection and the specific evaluations to be assigned within each factor are described in Table III-2 below.

Table III-2

Situational Constraints

| Situational Factor | Degree of Constraint |
|--|----------------------|
| Location of Intervention | |
| -in the territory of an ally | . low |
| -in the territory of a client state | . moderate |
| -in the territory of a neutral state | . high |
| -in the territory of a hostile state | . very high |

Rationale: the location of the intervention is likely to impact on the requirements for success. The more hostile the location, the greater difficulties in terms of security, world opinion, diplomatic resolution of the conflict, and so on.

Table III-2 (continued)

| Situational Factor | Degree of Constraint |
|---|----------------------|
| Nature of the opposition | |
| -sovereign state, well equipped, highly motivated | high |
| -revolutionary elements, well equipped and organized | high |
| -sovereign state, poorly equipped or motivated | moderate |
| -revolutionary or dissident elements, poorly equipped or organized | low |
| Rationale: the nature of the opposition may impact on the requirements for success; these evaluations suggest that the stronger and more well organized the opposition, the greater its ability to frustrate the purposes of the intervening power. | |
| Military capabilities of the intervening state | |
| -military capabilities not a significant consideration in policy formulation | low |
| -military capabilities constrain national policy | moderate |
| -military capabilities greatly constrain national policy | high |
| Rationale: military capabilities to move, mass, and employ forces in the target area may generate constraints hindering the attainment of national objectives. | |
| Inconsistency of intervention with previous policies | |
| -intervention fully consistent with previous policies | low |
| -intervention somewhat inconsistent with previous policies | moderate |
| -intervention highly inconsistent with previous policies | high |
| Rationale: consistency is required for effective coordination of policies. Lack of consistency could hinder the coordination of policies within a government or among allies. | |

Table III-2 (continued)

| Situational Factor | Degree of Constraint |
|---|----------------------|
| Lack of public support for intervention | |
| -aroused public, widespread support | . . . very low |
| -potential public support | . . . low |
| -little public awareness, public reaction uncertain | . . . moderate |
| -potential public controversy | . . . high |
| -aroused public, open and widespread disagreement | . . . very high |
| Rationale: lack of public support imposes additional constraints on contingency operations which may impact on their success | |
| Risks of escalation | |
| -intervening power incurs no risks of great power opposition | . . . low |
| -intervening power risks covert or indirect great power opposition | . . . moderate |
| -intervening power risks direct great power confrontation | . . . high |
| Rationale: escalations which incur high risks of great power confrontation may be constrained into patterns which contribute to failure | |

The military methods and objectives employed in contingency operations form another important set of comparative characteristics, critical to the central issue of political military coordination. Five aspects of military techniques were selected for data development. These included the clarity of the strategic military objectives, the coordination of tactical with strategic objectives, the amount of military power employed relative to the opposition, the overt violence ensuing, and political constraints on tactical operations. These aspects are evaluated by their presumed degree of unfavorable impact in Table III-3.

Table III-3

Military Objectives and Methods

| Military Aspect | Presumed Degree of Unfavorable Impact |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------|
|-----------------|---------------------------------------|

Lack of clarity of strategic military objectives

- | | |
|---|------|
| -military objectives vague or altered during intervention | high |
| -military objectives clearly and consistently defined | low |

Rationale: ambiguous or inconsistent military objectives will hinder political-military coordination; alternatively, poorly defined objectives result from improper political-military coordination.

Lack of coordination of tactical with strategic objectives

- | | |
|--|------|
| -tactical objectives, dispositions, methods not well coordinated with strategic aims | high |
| -tactical objectives, dispositions, methods well coordinated with strategic objectives | low |

Rationale: tactical objectives, dispositions, or methods which are poorly coordinated with the strategic military objectives or violate elemental military precepts risk ineffective military action

Economy of military power employed or displayed relative to opposition

- | | |
|---|------|
| -military power incapable of inflicting rapid and decisive defeat upon the opposition | high |
| -military power capable of inflicting rapid and decisive defeat upon enemy | low |

Rationale: a limited display of military capabilities may encourage resistance by the opposition

Overt violence

- | | |
|---|----------|
| -military forces employ significant and widespread violence | high |
| -military forces employ some violence | moderate |
| -military forces avoid violence | low |

Table III-3 (continued)

| Military Aspect | Presumed Degree of Unfavorable Impact |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------|
|-----------------|---------------------------------------|

Rationale: the amount of violence may be directly related to the intensity of the opposition which the intervention arouses; or, the amount of violence may be inversely proportional to the success of the operation in intimidating opponents.

Lack of political constraint on tactical operations

| | |
|---|--------------|
| -tactical operations greatly constrained by political considerations | . . low |
| -tactical operations somewhat constrained by political considerations | . . moderate |
| -tactical operations little constrained by political considerations | . . high |

Rationale: lack of political constraint on tactical operations may hinder attainment of national political aims.

The various aspects of policy coordination among the elements of national power form a final set of characteristics to be compared. These aspects include the degree of independence of the military operations from reliance upon diplomatic efforts to achieve full impact, the constraint or support afforded by international organizations, the availability of diplomatic channels of communications with the opposition, and the moral and legal justifiability of the contingency operation. These aspects of policy coordination are evaluated in Table III-4.

Table III-4

Policy Coordination Factors

| Coordination Factor | Presumed Degree of Unfavorable Impact |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
|---------------------|---------------------------------------|

Lack of independence of military operations

- | | |
|--|----------|
| -military objectives and methods designed to accomplish most of national aims through brute force | low |
| -military objectives and methods somewhat dependent upon diplomatic and political measures for full impact | moderate |
| -military force, heavily dependent upon diplomatic and political measures, cannot accomplish national aims | high |

Rationale: the higher the dependence of military operations upon political and diplomatic factors, the more difficulties will arise in supporting the national aims

Constraint from international organizations

- | | |
|--|----------|
| -international organizations mediate to obtain withdrawal of intervening force and/or most rapid termination of conflict | high |
| -international organizations mediate and are somewhat inclined toward the intervening power | moderate |
| -international organizations mediate to support the intervention and insure termination successful for intervening power | low |

Rationale: International organizations can greatly hinder the application of political-military pressures to the target group.

Lack of diplomatic communications with opposition

- | | |
|--|------|
| -diplomatic contacts available only through extraordinary means or the local political structure unusable or political power non-transferrable | high |
|--|------|

Table III-4 (continued)

| Coordination Factor | Presumed Degree of Unfavorable Impact |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
|---------------------|---------------------------------------|

| | |
|---|----------------|
| -normal diplomatic contacts available; or, local political structure still workable | . . . moderate |
| -talks or negotiations already under way | . . . low |

Rationale: the more difficult normal diplomatic communication with the opponents becomes, the more difficult will be the achievement of the political aims of the operation; alternatively, the more disrupted the local political structure, the more difficult police-type stabilization will become

Moral/legal justifiability

| | |
|--|----------------|
| -intervention highly questionable on moral/legal grounds by world opinion | . . . high |
| -intervention somewhat within the bounds of moral/legal propriety as viewed by world opinion | . . . moderate |
| -intervention clearly within the bounds of moral/legal propriety as viewed by world opinion | . . . low |

Rationale: For the intervening power, the lower the justifiability of his actions, the greater the difficulty in coordinating and gathering support for his policy

Limitations

Several limitations of this research methodology deserve mention. First, the methodology is non-quantitative. Its comparisons and conclusions are drawn without statistical inference and thus lack whatever degrees of assurance such methods might provide. The verbal evaluators, high, moderate, and low, are valid only relatively within the particular aspect to which they were applied.

Though the material to be investigated is historical in nature, the requirements for selecting contingencies have necessarily limited the perspective which may be taken upon events. In some cases the time perspective of this research may be inadequate to assess fully the impact of particular actions. For example, it may be argued that the full extent of the British failure at Suez has yet to be felt, almost twenty years after the event. Moreover, it should be noted that the international environment was relatively stable during the fifteen years covered in this investigation, and that the international environment has begun to change very rapidly since that time.

Finally, the data developed in this paper is of Western origin; nowhere are the viewpoints and perceptions of the target groups represented. This is an unfortunate limitation since so many of the variables involved in the analysis are perceptions of one factor or another, for example, the perception of the military power of the intervening state by the target group, rather than measurements of absolutes or physical objects. However, this limitation probably is similar to the difficulties confronting decisionmakers prior to the operation.

Notes - Chapter III

¹Roger A. Leonard, A Short Guide to Clausewitz On War(New York: Capricorn Books, 1968), p. 89.

CHAPTER IV

SEVEN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS:

SUMMARIES AND ANALYSES

This chapter presents the seven contingency force operations selected in Chapter III for study. Each operation is described briefly; the coordination of national strategic aims with military operations is analyzed; and the comparative factors in the intervention are assigned evaluations.

The Korean War (1950-53)

When North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea in June, 1950, the US found itself in a new strategic era. US possession of nuclear arms had not deterred local conflict, nor could US logistics and advisory assistance bring the conflict to successful termination. US intervention in Korea provides fundamental lessons in the coordination of military and political objectives in an essentially defensive war. The difficulty of this coordination is well illustrated by the confusion and frustration which US policies generated both in and out of government.

Background. Korea had been annexed in 1910 by Japan as a result of the Russo-Japanese War. In 1945 the US and the USSR jointly liberated Korea and received the surrender of

the Japanese forces stationed there. Divided notionally at the 38th Parallel for the convenience of the occupying powers, Korea was quickly split into two permanent camps. US-Soviet difficulties in coordinating the occupation led the US to seek the Moscow Agreement of 1945, under which the two powers would work systematically toward the eventual unification of the two zones. However, Soviet intransigence persisted. In 1947 the US asked the United Nations to investigate the problem. A UN Commission recommended unification through nationwide elections but, faced with Soviet opposition, supervised elections only in the South. In 1948 the Republic of Korea was formally established; in retaliation the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea was created in the North one month later.

US interests in Korea from the conclusion of World War II had been limited. The US had attempted to fulfill its postwar duties properly and turn Korea over to self-government. With the rise of US-Soviet tensions and the fall of China to the communists, Korea assumed new importance as a testing ground of the Free World. It also occupied a strategic location between China and Japan. All US occupation troops were withdrawn from Korea in 1948; only a small military advisory detachment was left. This drawdown of strength was accompanied by a certain amount of US ambivalence about the US strategic interests in Korea, including a January 1950 speech by the Secretary of State which excluded Korea from the US defense perimeter.¹

Crisis. On 25 June the North Korean forces struck across the 38th Parallel against the ill-prepared forces of the South. In a rapid advance they threatened to overrun Seoul and smash the South Korean defensive positions before they could be firmly established. The attack was apparently a strategic surprise, though it seems to have been predicted with some accuracy weeks before in Seoul.

US intervention. US response to the invasion was prompt. The US commander in the Far East, General MacArthur, immediately sent ammunition and other supplies to Korea under escort.² The US requested a meeting of the UN Security Council. By a vote of 9 to 0 the Security Council adopted a US resolution designed to bring a rapid cessation of combat and the subsequent withdrawal of North Korean forces; the resolution also called for all member nations to render assistance to the UN.³ The President ordered General MacArthur to provide Korea with additional logistic support and to use any necessary air and naval forces to prevent the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area from being overrun, thereby insuring the evacuation of American noncombatants.⁴ When General MacArthur visited the combat area on 27 June he concluded that US ground forces would also be needed.⁵ The commitment of US ground forces was approved by the President outside the framework of the UN. Only in early July was the United Nations Command established in Korea, with the US as executive agent.

The US committed its forces piecemeal to stop the

North Korean advance. The front was stabilized only after the UN Command had been forced back to the Pusan Perimeter in August, 1950. Meanwhile, General MacArthur developed a plan to regain control of South Korea and destroy much of the North Korean force by executing an amphibious landing far up the western coast of Korea at Inchon.

The Inchon landing, launched on 30 September, proved completely successful. US forces quickly recaptured Seoul and cut the North Koreans' main supply route. Concurrently, the UN forces remaining in the Pusan Perimeter broke out to the north and conducted a vigorous pursuit of the North Koreans. In the space of a few short days the North Korean Army had been broken as a coordinated fighting unit.

Encouraged by his success at Inchon and left under somewhat ambiguous instructions, MacArthur exploited to the north.⁶ In rapid moves his forces took Pyongyang and pushed deep into North Korea. Some elements reached the Yalu River in mid-November. But UN moves to the north provoked forceful Chinese intervention, and the UN elements were again pushed south.

After some seven months of offensive and counter-offensive the Chinese field armies began to experience severe organizational and logistic difficulties. UN forces had again penetrated into the dominant terrain south of Pyongyang. Through the Soviet representative at the UN the Chinese proposed a ceasefire and peace negotiations. After two years of bitter negotiating and inconclusive military

actions, an armistice was concluded which restored a demarcation between the North and the South not too far from the old 38th Parallel boundary.

Results. US intervention in Korea defeated the Communist thrust into the South and preserved the independence of South Korea. The feasibility of using the UN as an agency of collective defense was established, though the difficulties of motivating and coordinating collective political-military operations were amply demonstrated, also. The Korean War emphasized the importance of developing clearly-stated political objectives and coordinating military operations to obtain those objectives. Finally, the intervention demonstrated the extreme sensitivity of limited war operations to public opinion.

Analysis. US national objectives in the Korean intervention were at least threefold: first, halt the aggression by the North and restore the territory of the South; second, honor a commitment to an ally in the face of Communist aggression (preserving the credibility of the alliance system); third, implement the collective security arrangements of the UN to fight Communist aggression. The US did not initially seek reunification of the two Koreas.⁷ However, the US did vote for a December, 1950, UN resolution which called for a cease-fire with nationwide free elections.⁸

Strategic military objectives were unclear. The first mission assigned to US forces was to halt the advance of the North Koreans and repel the invasion, but this was-

sion was obscured by the added concern to destroy the North Korean Army, and, if necessary, occupy the North.⁹

Tactical military missions were several, including blocking the enemy advance, conducting the Inchon landing, pursuing to the North, and conducting several counteroffensives. A naval blockade was effected and bombing and interdiction were conducted throughout the peninsula.

US strategic military objectives were selected to obtain by force the national objectives. However, the destruction of the North Korean Army seems to have been unnecessary to attain the national objectives. Only if one assumed that no diplomatic settlement could ever be obtained would such a step have been necessary, but such an assumption would have logically required not only the destruction of the enemy army but also the continued occupation of the North to prevent its rearming. Moreover, it had been apparent throughout the policy apparatus in the US in 1950 that any action in Korea risked Soviet or Chinese counteraction, with the risk increasing as US forces penetrated further north. The US sought no wider war with Communist forces in what was considered a peripheral area. Unfortunately, the ambivalent military strategy combined with the political perspectives of the US commander in the Far East to foster the UN advance to the north which brought the Chinese into the war.

The overall coordination of military power with the other elements of diplomacy and national influence was poor throughout the Korean intervention. In the beginning General MacArthur reinforced the South Koreans without waiting for

instructions from Washington. While his support was limited to resupplies immediately available to him, the resupply was nevertheless not routine and was escorted by US forces. This action clearly risked confrontation. It is true that the US action was supported by efforts in the UN to generate broadly-based diplomatic support. But from the start the US intended to play the dominant role militarily and carried the major burdens of the war. Nor was the diplomatic effort without serious strains from the US' European allies who were oriented to the West.

One element of political-military coordination did work effectively, however. From the outset MacArthur had argued in favor of a wider war. He had suggested bringing in the Chinese Nationalists, he called for a naval blockade of China, and he sought authority to conduct strategic bombing against China. While the military effects of these acts would doubtless have been positive, any advantages would have been far outweighed by adverse political impact, and they were wisely resisted. Thus the military methods and objectives were held compatible with the political objectives in spite of strong pressures to the contrary.

Once their counteroffensive had been blunted in the Spring, 1951, the Chinese forces developed a new strategy. Under the diplomatic cover of a cease-fire, they began a war of attrition designed to extract the most favorable terms from the eventual settlement. US policymakers agreed to the cease-fire at a time when significant military advances could have been made to establish a much more favorable negotiating

position.¹⁰ Moreover, the cease-fire produced mounting public pressure to end the war quickly and with the fewest casualties possible. There seems little doubt that US reluctance to engage in the diplomacy of negotiations supported by the full force of its military superiority made the negotiations more difficult and prolonged.¹¹

There is little to indicate that US strategic military capabilities exerted a dominant role in the initial formulation of the national objectives, though perhaps MacArthur's prompt response with assistance in late June set the stage for later national decisions. The decision to intervene was made on the assumption that adequate forces could be mustered to repel the invasion of the South. However, US strategic success at Inchon certainly obscured the nation's view of its true objectives in Korea. The momentum of the successful advance was extremely difficult to contain from Washington.¹² And in consequence the results which could have been achieved with élan in October, 1950, were not confirmed until three years later, at a cost of thousands of American lives.

In sum, Korea was a lesson in the necessity for proper coordination of military and political objectives, and for the use of military forces in coordination with the other elements of national influence. While the basic objective of the intervention was achieved, it was achieved at costs in lives and political turmoil at home which far exceeded what would have been expended if the national and strategic objectives had been more clearly defined and

closely coordinated early in the operation.

Assignment of comparative evaluations. The national objectives, situational constraints, military objectives and methods, and policy coordination factors were assigned evaluations as shown in Table IV-1 below.

Table IV-1

Comparative Evaluations - Korea

| Comparative Aspect | | | | | | Evaluation Assigned |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------|
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| National objectives | | | | | | |
| -defend | . | . | . | . | . | primary |
| -support/stabilize | . | . | . | . | . | secondary |
| -coerce | . | . | . | . | . | tertiary |
| -seize | . | . | . | . | . | ----- |
| Situational constraints | | | | | | |
| -location | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -opposition | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -military capabilities of intervening state | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -inconsistency of policies | . | . | . | . | . | moderate |
| -lack of public support | . | . | . | . | . | very low - high |
| -risks of escalation | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| Military objectives and methods | | | | | | |
| -lack of clarity of strategic objectives | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -lack of coordination of tactical and strategic objectives | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -economy of military power | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -overt violence | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -lack of political constraint | . | . | . | . | . | moderate |
| Policy coordination factors | | | | | | |
| -lack of independence of military effort | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -constraint from international organizations | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -lack of diplomatic communication with opposition | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -lack of moral/legal justifiability | . | . | . | . | . | low |

The Suez Intervention (1956)

In October, 1956, following a prolonged dispute over control of the Suez Canal, British and French forces launched a combined attack against Egypt. The 1956 intervention provides a classic case of coercive warfare. The Suez action exemplifies both the military difficulties of conducting combined operations and the diplomatic hazards of major power - minor power confrontation by limited war. Though British and French military forces were well on their way to securing control over the Canal, their territorial gains were completely nullified by diplomatic factors. The result was a major shift in diplomatic influence in the Middle East.

Background. Britain's long-term interest in Egypt stemmed from the strategic importance of the Suez isthmus along the land and sea routes to India. With the independence of India in 1947 Britain's old strategic interest in Egypt was largely removed. However, new interests developed. Some 25% of British trade passed through the Canal in the early 1950's and British dependence on Middle East oil, much of which also passed through the Canal, could only increase.¹³ In addition British presence in the Canal began to be viewed as an integral link in the world-wide anti-Communist strategy of containment. And, in fact, Britain simply felt that she belonged in Egypt.¹⁴

Unfortunately, British colonial policy in Egypt had been an almost consistent failure. Egypt was granted nom-

inal independence in 1922, but large numbers of British troops remained there. By 1952, after decades of antagonism Egyptian nationalists had begun to employ guerilla tactics against the British troops in Suez. After Colonel Nasser deposed King Farouk in 1952 relations failed to improve. Britain's strategic interests in Jordan and its maintenance of a balance of power in the Middle East aroused the enmity of Arab Socialists, and under an Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1954 Britain committed itself to the withdrawal of all British forces by 1956.

France's interests in Egypt were somewhat different than Britain's. A considerable amount of the Canal Company stock was owned by Frenchmen, and France was also dependent on the Canal for the oil trade. But France's primary concern in the mid-1950's had become the successful termination of the rebellion in Algeria; Nasser's very presence stimulated Algerian insurrection, and in addition, Nasser was supplying the Algerian rebels with material assistance.¹⁵ Many in France felt that the elimination of Nasser was a necessary condition for quelling the revolt in Algeria.

Egyptian seizure of the canal. In July, 1956, the US cancelled its commitment to assist Egyptian construction of the Aswan dam. A variety of explanations was offered, including anger at the Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement, Egyptian financial insolvency, and US Congressional doubts about the project. Britain rapidly followed the US lead in terminating assistance. In response to the British action, President

Nasser declared the Suez Canal nationalized.

Egyptian nationalization had several aims. Directly the seizure represented a deliberate attempt to retaliate for the West's insulting cancellation of economic assistance at Aswan. But since 1955 Egypt had been attempting to gain greater benefits from the Canal, which was, admittedly, Egypt's major resource. Eventual nationalization was clearly in line with Nasser's general philosophy as well as his personal political needs. Moreover, in early 1956 Nasser had expressed his intent to nationalize the Canal.¹⁶

Western response. The British were, of course, furious with Nasser's action. As Eden told Andrew Foster, US Charge d' Affairs, "The Egyptian has his thumb on our windpipe. Tell Mr. Dulles I cannot allow that."¹⁷ In addition to their expressed concern for shipping through the Canal, the British were concerned for their general strategic position. Nasser's Arab Socialism threatened not only British influence in Iraq and Jordan but also the anti-Communist Baghdad Pact directed against the Soviet Union. And worldwide British prestige was at stake. In addition Eden was experiencing political difficulties at home and feared for his government unless he could act forcefully to put down this Egyptian "Mussolini."¹⁸

The French reacted even more vehemently than the British. They saw in Nasser a dictator in the mold of Hitler and; in his seizure of the Canal, they saw the ideal casus belli with which to gain British support to eliminate him.¹⁹

US response was cool. The US tried to avoid condemning nationalizations in principle and seemed to fasten on Britain's concern for her shipping as the most important issue at stake.²⁰

Despite his fury, Eden felt unable to react immediately with military force. And, in truth, Britain's legal claims to the Canal were not unambiguous. Britain's claim rested on the ninety-nine year lease of 1869 under which the Canal was constructed and in which the government of Britain had purchased a controlling interest. Subsequent Anglo-Egyptian treaties had allowed British troops to defend the Canal in case of war; however, the 1954 treaty specifically excluded Egyptian war with Israel from this provision. The British claims were complicated by several factors. First, the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1954 had emphasized that the Canal was an integral part of Egypt. Second, Britain herself, during both World Wars, had been guilty of violating the international agreements concerning the management of Canal stipulated at the Constantinople Convention of 1888. This agreement called for free access to the Canal for ships of all nations at all times.²¹ Egypt had also contravened the Convention by blacklisting Israeli shipping through the Canal in May, 1948, but Britain had allowed that contravention to stand. Moreover, the British-controlled canal company had failed to meet its agreed program of modernization for the Canal. Third, Britain, in a similar situation, had acquiesced to Turkish control over the Dardanelles. In short the legalities of the affair did not justify an Anglo-

seizure of the Canal.²²

Britain and France chose to react financially and diplomatically. Egyptian sterling deposits in Britain were frozen, and Prime Minister Eden sought to develop US diplomatic support for an eventual Anglo-French takeover of the Canal. A conference of major users of the Canal was held in London in late August. The conference produced a scheme for an international Suez Canal Authority to oversee the operation of the Canal; when the plan was taken to Egypt, Nasser rejected it. While Eden sought stronger American support for direct action, the Canal continued to operate. A second plan was developed which called for a Suez Canal Users Association, which seemed to imply that if Nasser misbehaved, he would be set right by force. But when Eden gave this implication of the plan in September, the US quickly made apparent that it would under no circumstances tolerate the use of force against Egypt over the Canal.²³ In fact, American opposition to the use of force over the Canal had hardened since the early moments of the Egyptian seizure.

In late September the Anglo-American impasse forced the British to shift their diplomatic efforts to the United Nations. From the UN consultations a six-point resolution emerged which was supported by the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Egypt. This 13 October resolution provided for free and open transit through the Canal for ships of all nations and for the respect of Egyptian sovereignty. But further progress diplomatically was overcome by events in the Middle East.

Military Intervention. In fact, neither Britain nor France had the available manpower or equipment to undertake an immediate seizure of the Canal after its nationalization by Egypt. However, almost immediately the two countries initiated joint planning.

The first plan called for a landing at Alexandria and a march across the desert against Cairo to force Nasser from office; if he remained in leadership, the task force should then have to turn eastward and seize the Canal itself. This plan had the great virtue of taking action directly against Nasser, who was seen to be the cause of the problem. And though the amphibious landing at Alexandria was to be disturbingly orthodox, the large port complex there would be invaluable in building up supplies for the landing force.

By mid-September a new plan had been developed; the march against Nasser had been ruled infeasible for political reasons, and the new plan detailed direct action against the Canal. Although port facilities in the area were limited, the forces would be in position to move directly to secure their objectives. The move south along the Canal would be very restricted by the road network, however, and the element of surprise would be lacking once the operation commenced. In order to minimize the casualties resulting from the operation, the new plan called for an extended period of aerial bombardment. This action would destroy the Egyptian Air Force and, it was hoped, would also demoralize the populace and wreck Nasser's political base.

This basic plan was modified many times before it was finally adapted to take advantage of the Israeli attack.²⁴

Having coordinated with and been assured the support of Britain and France, Israel sent its forces in the Sinai on 29 October and achieved rapid success. By prearrangement a joint Anglo-French ultimatum was issued to both Israel and Egypt demanding their withdrawal to areas 16 kilometers to either side of the Canal. In consonance with the plan Israel accepted the ultimatum on the condition that Egypt do likewise. Egypt refused.

On 31 October the RAF commenced bombing raids to destroy the Egyptian Air Force and other military targets and continued to bomb until 3 November. But, due to shipping difficulties and fears of a large concentration of Egyptian armor in the area, the airborne assault and subsequent amphibious landings around Port Said did not take place until 5-6 November, when Port Said was occupied and Anglo-French columns began a rapid move down the length of the Canal.

Results. British and French tactical efforts met with complete success. The Egyptian Air Force was almost completely destroyed. Canal airfield and Port Said were safely in British hands on 6 November, and by midnight of the 6th the British and French columns had advanced some 23 miles south along the Canal. British and French losses during the action totalled some 33 killed and 155 wounded.²⁵ Egyptian losses were estimated at 650 killed and about 2,000 wounded, including civilians.²⁶

But politically the results could not have been more disastrous. The British bombing immediately provoked world outrage, and the details of a cease-fire were being arranged even before the actual invasion occurred. Under US and Soviet diplomatic pressures, including a vague Soviet threat to use nuclear weapons against the British, the British and French accepted a cease-fire in place on the evening of 6 November.²⁷ By mid-December the Anglo-French force had been withdrawn under severe diplomatic pressure and replaced by a UN peacekeeping force. The action neither destroyed Nasser nor restored British prestige in the area. Jordan rejected further British aid; Nasser retained control of the Canal; right wing parties in Syria were eliminated; British and French assets in Egypt were seized; and the Anglo-French treaty of 1954 was denounced. France failed to halt the flow of Egyptian aid to Algeria and, by aligning herself with Israel provoked further Arab enmity. British and French interests were further harmed by the concomitant rise in Soviet influence and the rupture of NATO.

Analysis. British aims in the Suez venture were twofold: first, to insure at least access, and more desirably, control over the Suez Canal;²⁸ second, to preserve and reinforce Britain's strategic position in the Middle East.²⁹ In the light of Nasser's vituperative anti-British propaganda, they had reasonable cause for concern, at least initially, that at some time in the future they would be barred from using the Canal. And Nasser's nationalization did threaten

British positions in the area; reestablishment of British presence in the Canal Zone would defile Nasser, set back Arab nationalism, stymie Soviet advances in the region, and possibly cause Nasser's overthrow.

French aims in the Suez venture were very simple: eliminate the threat to Algeria. At the least this meant a sound demonstration of French power to curb Nasser's influence. More desirably, Nasser would be forced from office.

The military objective selected for the operation was occupation of the Suez Canal from Port Said in the north to the city of Suez in the south.³⁰

The tactical objectives and scheme of maneuver included airborne assaults to seize Camil airfield near Port Said, the waterworks, and a key bridge, and amphibious landings to reinforce the airborne elements and provide armored firepower ashore. The linked-up elements were then to advance directly south along the banks of the Canal and destroy Egyptian resistance as they proceeded.³¹

Military strategy was to support the overall objectives by presenting Nasser with a demonstration of his powerlessness in a fait accompli, in the face of which his diplomatic and political support were expected to crumble. Certainly a completed Anglo-French invasion and occupation of the Canal Zone would offer graphic demonstration that the Egyptian military forces were unable to protect the Canal, and, by implication, that Nasser had overextended himself. Whether the completed invasion would have destroyed Nasser's diplomatic and political leverage has never been resolved.

Apparently, Britain never realized the extent to which the US was committed to oppose the use of arms in the area, and Eden seemed to feel that once the deed were done, US support would materialize.

In fact this military strategy was very poorly coordinated with the other elements of national power. When the immediate shock of the seizure was still in the air, when Egyptian capacity to manage the Canal had not yet been demonstrated, the military methods might have commanded considerable support. But the long delay allowed US diplomatic power the time to mobilize against the use of force and also caused Eden to lose the support of the House of Commons. The precise timing of the military adventure was terribly inopportune. Britain had just concluded a series of UN resolutions with Egypt in which Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal and the Egyptian responsibilities to allow unimpeded passage were recognized. The pretext for the invasion, that the Arab-Israeli fighting might damage the Canal, was weak from the beginning and quickly evaporated as the extent of French aid to Israel became known. Also, the taint of collusion with Israel sent immediate shock waves through British relationships with other Arab states.

More fundamentally, the British intervention was totally inconsistent with their long-term policies world-wide, which spoke of respect for the self-determination of peoples and a gradual withdrawal from commitments abroad.

Even had the military strategy been properly coordinated with diplomacy, the operation might have failed. The

capability of British-French forces to hold the Canal in the face of determined Egyptian resistance via guerilla warfare was highly dubious. In 1954 fully 80,000 British soldiers were involved in counterguerilla activity in the area, which was a major reason for Britain's decision to relinquish the Suez Canal base. Even had the continued occupation proved militarily feasible, the cost to the British taxpayer would surely have been such that it would not long have been borne.

In fact, the planning process for the operation was a clear indication that the military requirements for the operation heavily influenced the parameters of involvement, rather than the opposite. In the first place, Eden and the French leader Mollet could not have intervened immediately after the seizure had they wished to do so. Britain and France both lacked the quick-reaction transport capability and the trained manpower to intervene effectively thousands of miles away. Even after the preparations were under way it had become apparent that, first, the British lacked the tank transporters to assemble a capable anti-armor force, and second, they lacked the air transport to conduct massive air drops to seize the Canal. Both restrictions were significant. British concerns for the Egyptians' recently acquired Soviet armor dictated that they conduct a cautious operation until the Egyptian Air Force could be degraded so it could not interfere with air drops and close air support and until some British armor could be put ashore. The lack of air transport prevented simultaneous air drops

along the length of the Canal, which would at least have put Anglo-French forces throughout the Canal area quickly and thus enabled them to accept a cease-fire in place and still be able to control the entire Canal.

Diplomatic considerations did impact on the military scheme of maneuver and military methods, however. First, the landing was changed from Alexandria, a direct challenge to Nasser, to the Canal itself, to lessen the offense to world opinion.³² Second, the airborne and amphibious assaults were preceded by five days of intense British air activity against the Egyptian air force and other Egyptian military targets. Finally, the naval gunfire preparation for the landing at the Canal was scaled down to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties. Unfortunately, the prolonged bombing campaign, though conducted with extreme caution, backfired; it provoked an outcry from around the world as well as deep political division in Britain itself.

Finally, it should be noted that the tactical objectives bore no direct relationship to the national political aims. The landing at Port Said-Port Fuad was required because these cities controlled the only easy avenue of entrance into the Canal Zone. British forces were not available to enter from the south, and entry through the Sinai would have appeared as obvious collusion with Israel. The tactical problem of securing the urban areas of Port Said delayed the advance of the Anglo-French forces for several hours and heightened the impression of a Western force attacking a small and defenseless country. Had the pur-

pose of the intervention been strictly to protect the Canal in case of fighting the British could have interposed themselves along the Canal between the opposing forces anywhere to the east of the Canal, or even in two lines on either side of the Canal, leaving the Egyptians control over the Canal and, more importantly, control over the Egyptian cities at both ends of the Canal.

In sum, the Suez operation was a tragic attempt to marry the political ends with military means. The military strategy was poorly related to the diplomatic factors involved; and short term military successes could not have been transformed into a long-term occupation without a settlement which recognized the important diplomatic factors implicit in the situation. In critical areas the military capabilities forced strategy to take the less promising course, and the tactical objectives themselves detracted from the achievement of the national aims.

Assignment of comparative evaluations. The national objectives (of the British), situational constraints, military objectives and methods, and policy coordination factors were assigned evaluations as shown in Table IV-2 below.

Table IV-2

Comparative Evaluations - Suez

| Comparative Aspect | Evaluation Assigned |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| National objectives | |
| -defend | . |

Table IV-2 (continued)

| Comparative Aspect | | | | | | | Evaluation Assigned |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------|
| -support/stabilize | . | . | . | . | . | . | ----- |
| -coerce | . | . | . | . | . | . | secondary |
| -seize | . | . | . | . | . | . | primary |
| Situational constraints | | | | | | | |
| -location | . | . | . | . | . | . | very high |
| -opposition | . | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -military capabilities of intervening state. | . | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -inconsistency of policies | . | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -lack of public support | . | . | . | . | . | . | very high |
| -risks of escalation | . | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| Military objectives and methods | | | | | | | |
| -lack of clarity of strategic objectives | . | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -lack of coordination of tactical and strategic objectives | . | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -economy of military power | . | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -overt violence | . | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -lack of political constraint | . | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| Policy coordination factors | | | | | | | |
| -lack of independence of military effort | . | . | . | . | . | . | moderate |
| -constraint from international organizations | . | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -lack of diplomatic communication with opposition | . | . | . | . | . | . | moderate |
| -lack of moral/legal justifiability | . | . | . | . | . | . | high |

Intervention in Lebanon (1958)

Following the failure of the Anglo-French intervention in Suez in 1956 political conditions in the Middle East became highly unstable. Nasserite elements attempted coups in several Arab countries, and Western influence seemed to decline rapidly. US intervention in Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese government demonstrated the US commitment to stability in the area and succeeded in preventing a violent civil war supported by outside powers.

The Lebanon intervention provides an interesting study in the coordination of military and political objectives and methods in a crisis short of limited war.

Background. With his success in nationalizing the Suez Canal Nasser turned to consolidate his position of leadership in the Arab world. The ensuing struggles produced intense pressures in conservative Arab states such as Jordan and Iraq. Both countries took stringent measures to eliminate Nasser's influence and remained, to some degree, dependent on the West. The summer of 1957 saw a change in leadership in the government and armed forces of Syria which seemed to indicate that it had gone conclusively into the Communist camp. The US rushed military aid to Jordan as a symbolic and substantive measure. Unfortunately, the aid provoked further Syrian moves to the left, and by February, 1958, Syria had joined with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic. The forces of Arab Socialism then turned to Lebanon in earnest.

Both geographically and culturally Lebanon was the crossroads of the Middle East. Since having received independence from the French Mandate in 1944, the government of Lebanon survived the tensions of a composite Christian-Moslem state by precarious compromise. In 1956 the Christian president of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun, had taken steps to upset the compromise. Chamoun rigged parliamentary elections to keep rival Moslem leaders out of power and had taken steps to abrogate the provisions of the constitution by

succeeding himself in the presidency.³³ The ousted Moslem and Druze elements turned to Syria and Egypt for assistance. Armed rebellion broke out in May, 1958.

US interests in Lebanon were derived primarily from US concern to resist the spread of Communism in the Middle East. The US also felt some cultural ties to the Christian community in Lebanon. In January, 1957, after US opposition to British policy in Egypt had upset British influence in the region, the US acted to provide stability. President Eisenhower announced the Eisenhower Doctrine, which stated that the US would come to the aid of any nation faced with overt aggression from any country controlled by international Communism.³⁴ Only Lebanon formally accepted the Doctrine.³⁵

The crisis. The civil strife in Lebanon quickly developed into a stalemate despite material aid and advisors supplied by Syria to the rebels. The Lebanese Army commander, General Chehab, refused to allow his army to take sides in the struggle; since his army was composed of both Christians and Moslems, it would probably have disintegrated from the intense conflicts of loyalties. President Chamoun was cautioned by the American ambassador to avoid invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine unless the territorial integrity of Lebanon was genuinely threatened. However, the US did supply some military aid to Lebanon almost immediately. The Iraqi regime of Nuri es Said also felt threatened by the strife inside Lebanon and requested that the Western powers provide assistance to offset Syrian subversion. On 14 July Nuri es

Said and the royal family of Iraq were murdered by leftist revolutionaries. Chamoun appealed formally for US assistance under the Eisenhower Doctrine.³⁶

Intervention. The civil strife in Lebanon had been foreseen by US contingency planners. During the early months of 1958 US planning for intervention had been completed and the allocated forces were maintained at high states of readiness. At the time of Chamoun's call for assistance a US Marines Battalion Landing Team was only twelve hours sailing time from Lebanon. This BLT landed on the beach outside Beirut on the afternoon of 15 July and moved overland to the airport to set up security. A second BLT landed early the next morning and also moved overland to relieve the first BLT; the first BLT was then tasked with securing the port facilities in Beirut to support a build-up of supplies ashore. By 25 July 6,600 Marines organized into four BLTs and 4,000 soldiers from an airborne task force of the US 24th Infantry Division in Germany had arrived in Lebanon along with their tanks, artillery, and some air support.

The landing and logistic build-up proceeded relatively smoothly. Initial problems of military-civil coordination were encountered, however, when the Commander of the Landing Forces, General Wade, resisted a Lebanese request to divert his troops to safeguard the home of President Chamoun. A major mishap was narrowly averted when the move of the Marines to the port was blocked by elements of the Lebanese Army who were under instructions to resist the American

move by force. Fortunately, both problems were resolved without resort to violence and in such a manner as to preserve Lebanese prestige.³⁷

Results. The American intervention was accomplished without unfavorable effects. The prompt response of American forces emphasized US determination to support the stability of the region and to honor US commitments. The independence of Lebanon was preserved, if, in fact, the Syrians had ever threatened a takeover. American emissaries negotiated an end to the civil war by arranging the replacement of Chamoun by General Chehab, the restoration of the ousted Moslem leaders, and a more neutralist orientation of the country. Egyptian sensitivities were so provoked by the American intervention that the Arab League agreed to a Declaration of Non-Intervention in each other's internal affairs, thus providing the diplomatic cover under which US troops could be withdrawn.

It should be noted that the British conducted an airlift of forces into Jordan at approximately the same time and for the same purposes as the American intervention in Lebanon. The British intervention was also successful.

Analysis. The purpose of the US intervention in Lebanon was threefold: first, to preserve the independence of Lebanon; second, to honor an American commitment under the Eisenhower Doctrine (and thus maintain American credibility); third, to protect American lives. These objectives were all clearly stated at the time.³⁸

The strategic objectives in the intervention were twofold: first, to effect the prompt movement into Lebanon of a demonstrably powerful force; second, to be prepared to conduct whatever military operations might become necessary to preserve Lebanese territorial integrity without arousing the hostility of the Lebanese people.³⁹

The tactical objectives of the Lebanese operation were, first, control of the airfield and port facilities, second, establish local security and be prepared to move to other areas to conduct operations if necessary.⁴⁰

The military intervention in Lebanon accomplished the national purpose of honoring the commitment under the Eisenhower Doctrine. The timing of this intervention was quite delicate, however. Though Chamoun had begun to request US help in May, the US felt it must not move until there was clear evidence of some external threat to Lebanon. The coup in Iraq seemed to provide the sense of urgency necessary for the US to act upon the gradually mounting evidence of Syrian involvement. Protecting the borders and safeguarding American lives were contingency missions which, in fact, never developed.

The strategic objectives were accomplished. The US forces in Lebanon could have conducted vigorous operations against any Syrian move across the border. However, the ability of the US forces to stand against a determined guerrilla effort inside Lebanon or defeat a major Syrian attack aided by air support from the Soviets was highly questionable.

Strategic capabilities in general proved adequate to implement the strategic objective. The operation had been planned in some detail. Problems were discovered upon execution, of course, including some difficulty in deploying tactical air support from the US and various sanitation and health problems. Had the US forces been committed to combat from the outset these difficulties may have been significant. However, the plan worked well enough to accomplish the overall strategic objective in the face of the conditions prevailing at that time.

US military strategy was closely coordinated with the other elements of power. The timing of the intervention, as previously mentioned, was driven by the diplomatic requirements rather than the military capabilities. Also, the intervention was coordinated concurrently through the UN, though the US did act before the UN reached a consensus. The US also consulted with its European allies before launching the intervention. Even more fundamentally, the military strategy was nicely meshed with the situation inside Lebanon. With the struggle for power threatening to split the country apart, US forces managed to convey a sense of neutrality which avoided provocation to either side. US forces made no attempt to support President Chamoun personally but neither did they try to force his departure when the new president had been elected. US forces made no attempt to eliminate dissident elements inside the Arab quarter of Beirut or, later, inside the Christian quarter.

US tactical capabilities adequately supported the

military strategy adopted. US forces arrived with enough strength to react to any of several contingencies. Helicopter support provided rapid mobility and surveillance throughout the area while offshore Naval support could have supplemented the firepower in the landing area at Beirut. Several commentators felt that the US strength was excessive. This point is certainly arguable in view of the contingency missions which the task force received. In general, it could be argued that the strength was excessive only if the preponderant strength destabilized the situation, if the requirement for the large and powerful force delayed the response unacceptably, or if the strength deployed overtaxed US capabilities to react elsewhere. Only the latter condition could have been ascribed to the Lebanon intervention; but the intervention served the useful purpose of demonstrating the need for increased airlift capacity which was later developed. From the diplomatic viewpoint the force deployed does not seem to have been excessive.

The tactical objectives selected were appropriate for the intervention. The airfield and port complex were key because they provided the means of build-up and resupply in the area. An additional factor enhancing their desirability was that they appeared to be securable without initiating hostilities with the Lebanese Army. Later American forces were deployed outside the densely populated areas of Beirut and were protected from local harassment and sniping by units of the Lebanese Army. US forces were kept in a defensive posture prepared for rapid deployment else-

where in Lebanon.

In short, the diplomatic and military factors were nicely meshed in the Lebanon intervention. The strategic and tactical objectives were compatible with the overall purposes, and tactical methods and procedures were carefully coordinated to support diplomatic prerequisites.

Assignment of comparative evaluations. The national objectives, situational constraints, military objectives and methods, and policy coordination factors were assigned evaluations as shown in Table IV-3 below.

Table IV-3

Comparative Evaluations - Lebanon

| Comparative Aspect | Evaluation Assigned |
|--|---------------------|
| National objectives | |
| -defend | secondary |
| -support/stabilize | primary |
| -coerce | tertiary |
| -seize | ---- |
| Situational constraints | |
| -location | moderate |
| -opposition | low |
| -military capabilities of intervening state | low |
| -inconsistency of policies | low |
| -lack of public support | low |
| -risks of escalation | low |
| Military objectives and methods | |
| -lack of clarity of strategic objectives | low |
| -lack of coordination of tactical and strategic objectives | low |
| -economy of military power | low |
| -overt violence | low |
| -lack of political constraint | low |
| Policy coordination factors | |
| -lack of independence of military effort | high |

Table IV-3 (continued)

| Comparative Aspect | Evaluation Assigned |
|---|---------------------|
| -constraint from international organizations . . . | moderate |
| -lack of diplomatic communication with opposition . . . | moderate |
| -lack of moral/legal justifiability . . . | low |

Deployment to Kuwait (1961)

By 1961 the tide of Nasser's Pan-Arabism had begun to recede; national self-interest was reasserting itself as a force in Arab politics. When Kuwait received its independence from Britain in June, 1961, the strong-man ruler of Iraq, General Kassem, moved to annex the new state. The British intervention at the request of Kuwait demonstrates how Western military interventions have succeeded by playing off regional powers against one another to develop local support.

Background. Founded as a trading village in the Eighteenth Century, Kuwait emerged as a British protectorate after World War I. With the development of its tremendous oil resources in the late 1940's, the sheikdom grew rapidly in population and wealth. In 1961 Kuwait was granted full independence from Britain and joined the Arab League. Almost immediately General Kassem announced that Kuwait was only a province of Iraq and that he intended to annex it. There were simultaneous reports of threatening troop deployments inside Iraq, and on 30 June Kuwait formally requested alli-

ary assistance from Britain and Saudi Arabia.

British interests in the region had developed from its strategic location along the route to India. During the Nineteenth Century Britain had become involved in supporting a number of the local rulers on the Arabian Peninsula. When Turkey entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, Britain took advantage of the nationalist movements blossoming throughout the Middle East to strike at Ottoman power. British presence in the area remained strong after World War I, and the exploitation of oil reserves in the 1940's generated a further push into the Persian Gulf. Even after granting Kuwait full independence, Britain retained a defense commitment to the new country.⁴¹ The British commitment was buttressed by a strong interest in maintaining access to Kuwait's oil, in preventing Communist influence in the region, and in preserving British influence with other states in the Persian Gulf area.

British intervention. British response displayed none of the ambivalence of the Suez crisis of 1956. Not only did Britain have strong interests in Kuwait, but also the Iraqi claim failed to attract the support of other Arab countries.

In a purely defensive posture British troops commenced debarkation in Kuwait within two days after the call for assistance. Within a week nearly 6000 troops and two air squadrons were on station in Kuwait, and a few days later a British aircraft carrier arrived in support. A small detachment from Saudi Arabia also deployed to Kuwait.

British forces encountered no armed resistance during the operation.

Results. The British intervention to assist Kuwait was relatively successful. The military build-up was accomplished smoothly. The Iraqi's were apparently deterred from carrying out their threat of annexation, though they probably could have initially gained local superiority over the British forces. The British intervention aroused protests from Egypt, but the Arab League nevertheless supported British actions by providing eventually between 2000 and 3000 Arab troops to help protect Kuwait upon the withdrawal of the British forces. Without engaging in armed combat, Britain had used military forces to reaffirm her interests in the area and had managed to attract Arab political support critical to the withdrawal of the British units.

Analysis. British diplomatic aims in Kuwait appeared to be twofold: first, to honor a commitment made to guarantee the independence of a new country; second, to preserve stability and British influence in the Persian Gulf area.

The strategic military objective was to move forces into the area in a demonstration of British power. These movements were strictly deterrent in nature, since the Iraqi forces had not crossed the border to make good their threat.

The tactical objective of the British forces was to prepare a defense. The British forces staged from the Kuwait airport and set up a light screening force along the border in order to block enemy approaches into Kuwait city.⁴²

The strategic movement into the area was well suited to demonstrate British commitment. The ruler of Kuwait had appealed publicly for help, and, with Britain generally committed to all the Persian Gulf states except Iraq, any failure to respond would have severely weakened British influence.

The intervention was well coordinated with the other elements of power. Britain was quick to seize upon diplomatic support from the Arab League. This support not only lent added legitimacy to British intervention but also an effective mode for terminating successfully the operation.⁴³

Moreover, the intervention succeeded because it disregarded important elements of military planning in order to emphasize diplomatic objectives. The intervention was apparently made without a carefully prepared plan of war. Units were committed piecemeal as they became available and were not at full strength for seven days. But even with the British force at its full strength Iraqi superiority in tanks, artillery, and infantry was apparent.⁴⁴ Violent sandstorms in the area would have severely restricted the availability of the close air support upon which the British would have been dependent to overcome the deficiencies of artillery and antitank weapons. While the strategic movement itself was accomplished satisfactorily in light of its diplomatic objectives, the success of the British venture against a determined Iraqi thrust was problematical.

Tactical objectives and dispositions were, in particular, poorly designed to meet the most likely threat.

Considerations of Arab solidarity probably ruled out any direct thrust by Iraq against Kuwait city itself, yet this was the area which the British had prepared to defend. A more likely course of action might have been seizure of the Kuwaiti oil fields, located near the Iraqi border.⁴⁵ Certainly the Iraqi forces in the area were capable of pushing the British screening forces out of the area, seizing the oil fields, and thus requiring the British to fight their way back in again at the risk of destroying the installations there.

In actual fact, the British intervention was well coordinated diplomatically and seemed to accomplish the objectives which it assumed. Whether it actually deterred a serious Iraqi takeover attempt cannot be known, however.

Assignment of comparative evaluations. The national objectives, situational constraints, military objectives and methods, and policy coordination factors were assigned evaluations as shown below in Table IV-4.

Table IV-4

Comparative Evaluations - Kuwait

| Comparative Aspect | Evaluation Assigned |
|-------------------------|---------------------|
| National objectives | |
| -defend | tertiary |
| -support/stabilize | secondary |
| -coerce | primary |
| -seize | --- |
| Situational constraints | |
| -location | moderate |

Table IV-4 (continued)

| Comparative Aspect | Evaluation Assigned |
|---|---------------------|
| -opposition | moderate |
| -military capabilities of intervening state | low |
| -inconsistency of policies | low |
| -lack of public support | low |
| -risks of escalation | low |
| Military objectives and methods | |
| -lack of clarity of strategic objectives | low |
| -lack of coordination of tactical and strategic objectives | high |
| -economy of military power | high |
| -overt violence | low |
| -political constraint | moderate |
| Policy coordination factors | |
| -lack of independence of military efforts | high |
| -constraint from international organizations | low |
| -lack of diplomatic communication with opposition | moderate |
| -lack of moral/legal justifiability | low |

Deployment to Thailand (1962)

As the 1961 Geneva Conference on Laos began to unravel in the early months of 1962, Pathet Lao forces resumed their military offensive in the northwestern portion of Laos. In a perhaps deliberately ambiguous move the US deployed several thousand Marines and soldiers to northeastern Thailand. The political factors involved in the intervention indicate clearly the complexities associated with the coercive deployment of contingency forces.

Background. Guaranteed independence at the 1954 Geneva Con-

ference, Laos was unstable almost from the beginning. The Geneva Accords provided for a cease-fire, a withdrawal of forces into regroupment areas, incorporation into a single national army, and supervision by the International Control Commission (ICC). The ICC proved wholly ineffective in dealing with the Pathet Lao, and a de facto partition of the country resulted. The French failed to live up to their agreements in training the Laotian forces.⁴⁶ US aid to support the army generated inflation and corruption. The Pathet Lao then began a program of subversion and terror to extend their influence. By the late 1950's leadership had begun to change hands rapidly, with each leader pursuing a different policy with the Communists. Meanwhile, Pathet Lao influence and control in the countryside continued to expand.

US policy towards Laos was unsettled. The US had favored a non-Communist Laos, but then switched some support to Prince Souvanna Phouma, a man who was known to favor collaboration with the Pathet Lao. But at the same time the US continued to support right wing elements in Laotian politics. Some alterations in US support could be justified as attempts to prevent the US from becoming hostage to local anti-Communists, but much of the ambiguity stemmed from the uncertainty of American aims. However, the US was committed to protect Laos against external aggression through a protocol to the SEATO treaty.⁴⁷

Naturally, the presence of a nearby and successful insurgency disturbed Thailand. But even more disturbing to the Thai leaders was President Kennedy's policy of seeking

neutralization of Laos through a second Geneva Conference in 1961. This seemed to undercut the US commitment to Thailand through the SEATO treaty. During March, 1962, the Thai foreign minister visited Washington and was given assurances that the US would honor its SEATO commitment to Thailand.⁴⁸

The crisis. On 7 May, 1962, Pathet Lao forces launched a full-scale attack in northwest Laos in flagrant breach of the cease-fire which had been established in 1961. Royal Lao defense forces in the area quickly crumbled and fled across the border into Thailand. The attack was certainly an attempt to gain bargaining leverage at Geneva; it may have been a prelude to an attempt to overrun all of Laos or to attack into Thailand. The attack was a dramatic challenge to the SEATO warning of March, 1961, that if active military attempts to obtain control of Laos continued, SEATO would take action.⁴⁹

US response. On 18 May, 1962, the first contingent of US Marines landed in Thailand. Their deployment had been preceded by a carefully orchestrated scenario of preparations. Eventually, as many as 6,000 US troops were deployed in camps along the Laotian border in northeast Thailand. These forces were joined by small contingents of air and ground forces from the British and Australians. US troops did not engage in combat; in fact, many apparently had no live ammunition. The troops remained in Thailand for several months, with the first elements departing in July 1962, and other elements remaining until the next year.⁵⁰

Results. The results of the intervention are difficult to assess. Certainly the presence of troops did not deter the Pathet Lao from continuing their offensive, the May offensive resumed about one week after US troops had arrived. Further, the deployment may have stiffened the position of the right-wing Laotian elements who were resisting the settlement at Geneva. The deployment probably succeeded in reassuring the Thais that the US would honor its commitment to them, however, and it also preserved some credibility for SEATO. The intervention also seems to have strengthened the hand of the Soviet peacemakers at Geneva who were trying to urge a settlement on their allies. In the end, agreement was reached at Geneva in the summer of 1962, and a "troika" government was imposed on the area. Thailand was not directly attacked or threatened, and most US troops were soon withdrawn.

Analysis. The US objectives in the intervention were two-fold: first, to maintain pressure on the Communists to negotiate the neutralization of Laos; second, to reassure and be prepared to protect Thailand should the Pathet Lao attempt to exploit their successes.⁵¹ An important factor in the decision to deploy American troops, derived from the desire to reassure Thailand, may have been the need to protect American credibility.

US military objectives at the strategic level were to move the designated force into Thailand and be prepared for further contingencies.⁵²

At the tactical level, the force was sent to north-east Thailand in areas remote from the larger populated areas. Headquarters for the force was at Xieng Khong, near the Laotian border.

The movement of military forces was intended to demonstrate US concern at the aggravated breach of the cease-fire. Movement of US forces into Thailand seemed to suggest that any action directed against Thailand would be met by US forces. The possible role of these forces in Laos was left deliberately unclear. That is, the military strategy was a half-way measure calculated to intensify diplomatic pressure upon the Communist side without closing off US options. The US forces were apparently under no instructions to enter Laos upon specified preconditions, nor were they disposed or equipped to defend Thailand without substantial additional preparation.⁵³ Further decisions would have been required had the coercion not been effective in preventing an open confrontation with the US; the President had left his way open to make those decisions at the time of the challenge.

The deployment appears to have been made efficiently and could probably have been sustained indefinitely at that level of commitment. In fact, on several occasions in the preceding five months the Joint Chiefs of Staff had prepared contingency plans for committing large forces into Southeast Asia, possibly as many as 150,000 men.⁵⁴ However, the 6,000 men who were actually deployed would have been inadequate to undertake any effective military action had the diplomatic threat they represented been challenged in .

bat. The deployment was thus intrinsically risky from a military viewpoint.

However, the deployment was well coordinated with other elements of national influence and with the previous record of US actions in the area. The US had exerted pressure directly upon the Soviet Union in 1961, and continued private discussions with the Soviets after the deployment. The US had also indirectly threatened the deployment of forces. Indian help was enlisted to appeal for neutralization of the area. By the time the forces were actually deployed the limited extent of US aims in the area can be assumed to have been well understood by all parties. The effect of the coordination was to minimize the risks that the military forces deployed would actually engage in combat, while the deployment simultaneously demonstrated the US willingness to take the next step if need be. Obviously, the deployment had implications for US resolve throughout Southeast Asia.

As mentioned above, in this intervention purely military considerations were subordinated to diplomatic concerns. Thus the US troops were sent in (militarily) inadequate numbers, lacking supporting equipment, including sufficient ammunition, and were not effectively deployed to conduct military operations. In retrospect the deployment indicated just how closely military requirements might be tailored to convey a desired diplomatic message.

Assignment of comparative evaluations. The national objectives, situational constraints, military objectives and

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methods, and policy coordination factors were assigned evaluations as shown in Table IV-5 below.

Table IV-5
Comparative Evaluations - Thailand

| Comparative Aspect | Evaluation Assigned | | | | | |
|---|---------------------|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| National objectives | | | | | | |
| -defend | . | . | . | . | . | --- |
| -support/stabilize | . | . | . | . | . | secondary |
| -coerce | . | . | . | . | . | primary |
| -seize | . | . | . | . | . | --- |
| Situational constraints | | | | | | |
| -location | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -opposition | . | . | . | . | . | moderate |
| -military capabilities of intervening state | . | . | . | . | . | moderate |
| -inconsistency of policies | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -lack of public support | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -risks of escalation | . | . | . | . | . | moderate |
| Military objectives and methods | | | | | | |
| -lack of clarity of strategic objectives | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -lack of coordination of tactical and strategic objectives | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -economy of military power | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -overt violence | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -lack of political constraint | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| Policy coordination factors | | | | | | |
| -lack of independence of military effort | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -constraint from international organizations | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -lack of diplomatic communication with opposition | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -lack of moral/legal justifiability | . | . | . | . | . | moderate |

Engagement in Vietnam (1964-65)

In 1964 the US was deeply involved in an advisory and support role in the war in Southeast Asia. However, the

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increasingly intense conflict in South Vietnam had not brought success to the South Vietnamese government. The 1963 coup which had overthrown Ngo Dinh Diem had provoked several successive coups and resulted in increased demoralization and defeatism in the South. By 1964 it had become clear that the US backed governments in the South would not survive if the existing US policies were continued. In response to this evaluation the US embarked on a calculated program of intensifying the pressures on North Vietnam to cease supporting and organizing the war in the South. The failure of this graduated escalation provides important insight into the problems of coercive intervention.

Background. US interests in Vietnam developed slowly after World War II. But containment, the US response to the pattern of world-wide Communist aggression, had obvious implications for resisting a Communist-led insurrection. Communist successes in China provided further stimulus to help the French defeat the insurgency in Indochina. It could also be argued that aid to the French in Indochina was a quid pro quo for French support of US ideas about the rearmament of Western Europe; in May, 1950, the US decided to support the French effort in Indochina against the Viet Minh. By 1954 US aid was estimated to be financing 78% of the cost of the French military action there.⁵⁵ President Eisenhower considered direct US military intervention on the eve of the French loss at Dien Bien Phu but was dissuaded by the prospect of a large ground war in Asia.

However, with the French withdrawal from Southeast Asia via the Geneva Conference of 1954 the US began a more direct role in the area. Through the formation of SEATO in 1954 a direct US commitment for collective security in the area was assumed.⁵⁶ US advisors and military aid began to arrive in South Vietnam in 1957, and the US sought to develop in the South a conventional army to repel an invasion from the North. The US commitment to South Vietnam was reaffirmed by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

The South Vietnamese government to which the US was committed was never completely secure in power. Diem was a genuine anti-Communist nationalist and became increasingly powerful under the Emperor Bao Dai, but the South was rent by factional disputes among the Buddhist sects and the subversion of the residual Communist elements. The government devoted its initial efforts to consolidating its position against the Buddhist factions and their private armies and ignored the provision of the Geneva Accords which called for national elections to decide the issue of reunification. By 1957 the Communists had begun a campaign of subversion and terror designed to destroy the government in the South. The program was effective and the grip of the Saigon government on many rural areas was lost. Unable to secure control of the countryside, increasingly threatened from within, the government of Diem gradually folded inward. The economic, social, and political reforms necessary to extend the government's authority could not be effected, and a struggle with the insurgents by force of arms began.

By 1961 the situation in the South had become so bad that an American investigative mission recommended the deployment of a US military task force to assist the South Vietnamese.⁵⁷ Instead, more advisors, supplies, and helicopters were dispatched. Despite some initial success with this escalation of the conflict, the South Vietnamese could not gain decisive advantage, and the government began to lose troops and territory at an alarming rate. By 1963 it had become apparent to many in the US that the South Vietnamese could not win with Diem as their leader. With a great deal of ambivalence the US conducted a series of discussions with various South Vietnamese army officers which culminated in Diem's overthrow and assassination in November, 1963.

The change in leadership in the South proved no answer to the challenge posed by the Viet Cong, however. A chain of coups rivetted the South's military interest on its own capital, while mobilization for and direction of the war suffered. In the meantime the Communist expansion of control in the countryside continued and the North Vietnamese presence became more noticeable.

Changing the pattern of American intervention. As early as December, 1963, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), had advocated a bombing campaign to increase pressure against the North in response for its support of the war in the South.⁵⁸ Though these recommendations were not accepted military action against the North continued to be studied: a

series of covert operations by the South Vietnamese against the North was approved. These raids into the North were intensified in the early months of 1964. But in August a US Navy destroyer on an electronic reconnaissance mission off the coast of North Vietnam was attacked by North Vietnamese vessels, apparently under the belief that it was supporting the raids.⁵⁹ US aircraft retaliated in a strike at PT boat bases and oil storage depots at Vinh.

World and US public opinion supported the retaliatory raids, and President Johnson emerged from the Gulf of Tonkin incident with a broad Congressional endorsement. When he won election to the Presidency by a landslide margin, his options for dealing with the problem of Vietnam were considerably expanded. He initiated an intense Executive branch review of Vietnam policy in a search for new solutions. This review generated a consensus in favor of a two-phased escalation of the War: Phase I included intensified air activity over Laos and a continuation of covert actions against the North; Phase II was to consist of a sustained and intensifying air campaign against the North.⁶⁰ Phase I was implemented almost immediately, in December, but Phase II was deferred until General Khanh could bring the South Vietnamese government into some semblance of stability.

Viet Cong mortar attacks on US installations at Pleiku and Qui Nhon in February, 1965, sparked the decision to move to Phase II. The Executive review had recommended Phase II because there seemed no viable alternative; with the Viet Cong attacks most within the Administration's power

that, for a variety of reasons, this was the time to escalate.

The first sets of air strikes in February were again retaliatory, in response to the mortar attack at Pleiku, but later raids were justified only by a general reference to the bellicose activities of the North.⁶¹ Targetting for the initial raids was based primarily on political and psychological factors, but by the end of March, 1965, opinion within the Administration had hardened to support a bombing campaign directed more toward interfering with the North's capability to sustain the war in the South.⁶²

By April it became apparent that the bombing alone was insufficient to force a conclusion to the war. In an attempt to assuage world and domestic opinion, President Johnson dramatized the peaceful aims of the US by offering to start negotiations with the Vietnamese without preconditions; Johnson also promised to commit US aid to a billion dollar Mekong River Basin development scheme in which the North Vietnamese could participate.⁶³ North Vietnam rejected the offer of talks by issuing its Four Points Program for peace. In mid-May the Administration made a more concerted effort to initiate negotiations by ordering an unpublicized bombing halt for six days. No favorable North Vietnamese response was received, and bombing was resumed.

By May the decision had been made to plateau the bombing and redirect its emphasis toward interdiction of the lines of communications to the South.⁶⁴ US ground forces had been committed to the area and had begun to as-

sume an active combat role. By July, spurred by the South's repeated battlefield failures, another change in government in the South, fear of an imminent Viet Cong offensive to split the country in half, and the recognized failure of the strategy of graduated escalation, the US planned to deploy 44 ground combat battalions to the South.⁶⁵ In short, the US had undertaken a major land war on the Asian continent.

Results. Not only had the air war failed to produce an acceptable peace settlement, but it also did not succeed in preventing further deterioration in the South. The air attacks provided the focus at which international and domestic political protests could be directed, and they greatly constrained US political options. With its flexibility reduced and its commitment raised, the US was led inexorably to the assumption of a ground combat role in Asia. The short-term results of the expanded engagement are well-known: an eventual deployment of more than a half million men. The North Vietnamese plan for conquest was frustrated, but at a cost of mounting domestic political unrest, a financial outlay of \$30 billion per year, thousands of casualties, and the compromise of other aims at home and abroad.

Analysis. US national objectives in Vietnam were repeatedly affirmed by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson.⁶⁶ Though expressed in a variety of ways, these objectives tended to be threefold: first, help South Vietnam maintain its independence; second, prevent a Communist takeover in Asia; third, prevent the success of the test case of "X" s

of National Liberation" in Vietnam. Implicit in these objectives was the desire to maintain the credibility of the US commitment to its Allies. The National Security Council Working Group on Southeast Asia in 1964 recognized two basic policy objectives in Southeast Asia: help a government defend its independence, and work to preserve in Laos an international neutralized settlement. The Working Group noted that these policy objectives were in consideration of three factors: first, the general principle of helping countries defend their freedom against Communist attack and subversion; second, the specific consequences of Communist control of South Vietnam and Laos for the security of, successively, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines; and third, South Vietnam as a test case for the Communist "Wars of National Liberation" strategy.⁶⁷ The US made very clear that it did not seek the destruction of North Vietnam nor any changes in the governments of other countries in the area.⁶⁸

The military strategy of increasing the pressure on the North through bombing had basically three objectives.⁶⁹ These were, first, to signal to the Communists the firmness of US resolve, second, to boost the sagging morale of the South, and third, to impose increased costs upon the North. In fact, the primary proponents of bombing disagreed among themselves on what its most important purpose was to be. To McGeorge Bundy the main aim was to boost morale in the South, though he acknowledged that it would be no more than a temporary assistance.⁷⁰ To Ambassador Taylor, the main benefit of the bombing would be the coercion of North Vietnam into

halting its support of the war in the South.⁷¹ An alternative purpose of the bombing was suggested by some: the bombing would demonstrate to the other nations in Southeast Asia that the US had done all it could do and would thus facilitate eventual US disengagement. All of the high level decisionmakers felt that the purpose of the bombing was basically political and diplomatic rather than military, that it would affect the morale and will of the North Vietnamese rather than their military capacity.

The initial dispatch of US ground troops to the area had at least four purposes: first, to provide security for US personnel and facilities; second, to take some of the active combat burden off the South Vietnamese army; third, to signal the seriousness of the US resolve; and fourth, to bolster morale in the South.⁷² An additional purpose may have been to provide a negotiating lever once talks had begun and the bombing in the North was stopped.⁷³ The later decision to deploy 44 battalions represented a change in objectives to press for military defeat of the enemy in the South, though it was hoped that sometime before that stage the enemy might elect to give up.⁷⁴

The tactical objectives of the bombing in the North were selected for symbolic rather than military reasons. The first raids, in tit-for-tat fashion, struck in reprisal at army barracks and encampments in the North. Not until April did the interdiction mission really become established as the fundamental tactical objective of the air action. Ground forces were deployed to areas where high concentration

tions of US personnel were located, and, as these forces entered the active combat role, they began to be deployed into areas where the greatest Viet Cong ground threat was anticipated.

If one assumed that the war was essentially directed and supported from the North, then the support which the military strategy offered for the national objectives was clear. If the North could be dissuaded from its aims, the remaining insurgent elements in the South could be isolated and defeated. Unfortunately, the strategy offered little in the way of a fallback position if it was not successful. The resort to graduated pressure was, in itself, a fallback position, the last resort for attaining American aims. If the strategy failed, then the answer was, implicitly, either a stronger dose of the same medicine or a revision of US objectives.

And in fact the strategic objectives were unobtainable for the level of commitment the US was prepared to make. The US policymakers apparently overestimated the coercive effects which the air attacks could generate, despite State Department warnings that the effects would not be substantial.⁷⁵ The bombing threatened the North with loss of selected military, transportation, or industrial facilities; but it did not threaten the North with defeat in the South. Even the eventual concentration on the interdiction mission merely increased the cost to the North of supporting the war in the South without making the support impossible. The graduated escalation allowed time for the enemy to react to

the US pressures and sustain its morale, will, and physical support of the war. Nor could the limited numbers of ground troops which the US planned to deploy provide the force ratios which past experience had demonstrated were requisite for successful counterinsurgent operations in difficult terrain.

Moreover, the US overestimated the coercive pressures which could be generated by reaffirming the US commitment. For the North Vietnamese, the war in the South was essential to their national purpose; for them it was not a limited war. Given the improbability of US use of nuclear weapons and the fact that the US had committed itself not to destroy their society, the North could afford to risk the dangers of escalation, secure in the knowledge that US commitments elsewhere would eventually detract from US interest and dedication to the war in Southeast Asia.

The US strategy in South Vietnam followed closely the pattern of previous political-military maneuvers in crisis management. US policy was carefully tailored to show restraint. Care was taken to avoid excessive employment of force. World and US approval was gained initially by explaining the US escalation as reprisal for North Vietnamese activities in the South. And, the President offered the carrot of economic development, also. But still the US lacked any place to go with its diplomacy. No negotiations were ongoing over Vietnam. The Soviet Union and China, though at odds with each other, were far removed from the conflict in the South and had only limited influence at that time. Also-

way, appeals to the Soviet Union could hardly be expected to be effective when accompanied by overt attack upon a Communist country. Moreover, the US would have to halt the bombing to persuade the North to enter negotiations, and then what leverage would be available except US support for the South? And the longer the bombing continued, the more diplomatic pressure could be generated against the US to halt it.

The political intent which the graduated escalation was to communicate was probably not so clear as it seemed at the time to US policymakers. If the American response was deliberate, it may have seemed halting and irresolute to the enemy. If the American build-up was designed to be restrained, it may have appeared reluctant. In fact, policymakers were naive to expect the North Vietnamese to accept the American commitment as a prelude to massive and sustained American intervention when the US had made it clear in the past that it did not want to intervene in the war directly.

Within South Vietnam itself the military strategy was poorly coordinated with the other elements of power. The resort to military escalation was an admission that the non-military economic and political development programs of the South had failed, but the expansion of the military effort seemed to result in further deemphasis of these programs during the period 1964-65.

Limitations on the use of force rested not upon US capabilities but upon the overall scheme of the intervention. US capabilities were adequate to have mounted very intense

raids over the North. The introduction of ground troops proceeded much slower than the maximum rate which could have been supported.

Of course, US tactical capabilities certainly influenced the US strategy. The excellent communications and the highly responsive tactical airpower allowed the graduated reprisal strategy to be employed. And US tactical capabilities seemed so much greater than the enemy's that it was very difficult to persuade policymakers that the military strategy ought to be driven more by considerations of tactical advantage and less by concerns for political gains. But as Admiral Sharp, US commander in the Pacific warned,

Any political program which is designed to formulate terms and procedures for reaching agreement on cessation of a graduated program of military pressures will be successful in proportion to the effectiveness of the military pressures program itself.⁷⁶

In fact, the air objectives selected for the bombing could not contribute significantly to military pressure. These objectives were simply not the critical links in the North's support of the war in the South, though there were such critical links, later experience was to show that even when they were targetted, tactical airpower was simply not wholly effective in disrupting them. As for the objectives initially assigned the ground forces, little military pressure could be expected if they were achieved. Security of US bases was a military necessity but could do little to put pressure on the North or even to interfere with the North's capability to sustain the war. As US forces in the South shifted to the offensive role their contribution became more

significant, yet it was apparent that the 44 battalion force that was authorized in July, 1965, would be far from adequate to wage the war and defeat the enemy in the South, despite American technological superiority.

In retrospect, the national goals in Vietnam may not have been feasible at any price less than all-out war against the North. But certainly the strategy and tactics of graduated response were the inappropriate means by which to pursue the objectives.

Assignment of comparative evaluations. The national objectives, situational constraints, military objectives and methods, and policy coordination factors were assigned evaluations as shown in Table IV-6 below.

Table IV-6

Comparative Evaluations - Vietnam

| Comparative Aspect | | | | | | Evaluation Assigned |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------|
| National objectives | | | | | | |
| -defend | . | . | . | . | . | tertiary |
| -support/stabilize | . | . | . | . | . | secondary |
| -coerce | . | . | . | . | . | primary |
| -seize | . | . | . | . | . | --- |
| Situational constraints | | | | | | |
| -location | . | . | . | . | . | very high |
| -opposition | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -military capabilities of intervening state | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -inconsistency of policies | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -lack of public support | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -risks of escalation | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| Military objectives and methods | | | | | | |
| -lack of clarity of strategic objectives | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -lack of coordination of tactical and strategic objectives | . | . | . | . | . | high |

Table IV-6 (continued)

| Comparative Aspect | Evaluation Assigned | | |
|---|---------------------|---|----------|
| -economy of military power . . . | . | . | high |
| -overt violence . . . | . | . | high |
| -lack of political constraint . . . | . | . | low |
| Policy coordination factors | | | |
| -lack of independence of military effort . . . | . | . | high |
| -constraint from international organizations . . . | . | . | low |
| -lack of diplomatic communication with opposition . . . | . | . | high |
| -lack of moral/legal justifiability . . . | . | . | moderate |

Intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965)

In 1965, in the midst of its preoccupation with Vietnam, the US dispatched several thousand paratroopers and Marines to the Dominican Republic to safeguard American citizens and prevent a suspected Communist takeover there. The intervention graphically demonstrates several important aspects of successful contingency operations. Troops were dispatched and massed rapidly, military activities were well coordinated with political objectives, and planning for the termination of the operation was begun immediately. The Dominican intervention appeared, in the short term, singularly effective.

Background. A hodge podge of cultural heritages, Santo Domingo achieved independence from Haiti in 1844. A long flirtation with foreign governments and prolonged fiscal mismanagement followed. Naval bases were offered to a

powers, and in the years after the Civil War, Santo Domingo even offered itself up for annexation by the US. In 1907 the US intervened to take over the customs house to settle Santo Domingo's foreign debts. Nine years of financial and political instability culminated in the complete occupation of Santo Domingo by the US Marines in 1916. When the Marines were withdrawn in 1924, the Dominican Republic was founded.

Working his way up through the powerful constabulary, Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic in 1930. Trujillo gradually consolidated his position and by the 1950's was attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of other Latin American states. His actions against President Betancourt of Venezuela in 1960 earned him a censure by the Organization of American States, followed by economic reprisals by the US in accord with the OAS resolution. The resulting stresses in the Dominican Republic led to Trujillo's assassination in 1961.

Elections were held in 1962, and Juan Bosch, a leftish moderate, was elected president. However, Bosch's policies won him little favor with the army, which overthrew him in a coup in 1963 and forced him into exile. Bosch's supporters planned to regain power by the same means they had lost it - a coup - and succeeded in developing a following among some of the younger army officers.

US interests in the Dominican Republic had always been more concerned with keeping other powers out than with any positive results themselves. Under the Monroe Doctrine

the US had sought to prevent the creation of new colonies in the Western Hemisphere. US interest in the Caribbean was increased by the US acquisition of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal in the early Twentieth Century. The establishment of a Communist regime in Cuba in 1959 seemed to add another dimension to the threat to American interests in the Caribbean, the dimension of subversion supported by other Communist nations within the Western Hemisphere. The US interests also included responsibility for the safety of American citizens in the Dominican Republic.

Crisis. On 25 April, 1965, approximately 2,000 men from the rebel force launched a coup attempt with a seizure of the government radio station. The next day this force stormed the Presidential Palace. When the army did not respond to his request for assistance, President Don Reid resigned. However, as the aims of the rebels to reinstate Juan Bosch became clear, the higher ranking army officers formed a Junta in opposition, and they attempted to crush the rebels. By the 28th the situation had deteriorated to lawless violence throughout Santo Domingo, with the Junta unable rapidly to establish control. As the situation worsened reports began to reach the US from the American Ambassador that the rebels were led by or infiltrated with a large number of Communists.⁷⁷

US response. On 28 April President Johnson directed the landing of some 500 Marines to safeguard the lives of Americans who had rallied at the Embajador Hotel.⁷⁸ The next day,

International Zone was established in Santo Domingo; this area was to consist of the hotel area and the embassy areas. Another battalion of 1,500 Marines was landed to protect this Zone. The President also ordered the 82nd Airborne Division to deploy in the area; the first elements of the 82nd were airlanded at San Isidro airfield on 30 April.

The US had worked diplomatically with the OAS while it had intervened unilaterally. On the 30th of April the OAS called for a cease-fire, which the US forces accepted. This cease fire did hinder the consolidation of the US position, but the two forces, one in the International Zone, the other across the river at the airport, were soon linked up; a corridor which split the rebel-held area was established. By 8 May US forces in the Dominican Republic totalled some 23,000. And on 15 May the first contingent of an OAS peace-keeping force arrived to supplement and eventually to relieve the US forces.

Results. US military actions were successful in preserving the safety of American nationals and preventing further deterioration of the situation in the Dominican Republic. Communist forces did not gain power, and a coalition government was eventually arranged through the OAS. US troops were gradually withdrawn under the auspices of the OAS's successful termination of the crisis. The US forces involved in the intervention suffered some 73 casualties.

Analysis. US national objectives in the Dominican intervention were twofold: first, to prevent the establishment of

a Communist government in the Dominican Republic; second, to provide for the safety of American citizens in the area.⁷⁷

The purpose of the military intervention was first to provide for the physical security of American nationals in Santo Domingo. The intervention was also designed to shock the leftist forces into submission and restore some order to the area while the diplomatic aspects of the transition of government could be handled.⁸⁰ The size of US forces was increased as the Communist control of the rebellion became more clear.⁸¹

The tactical objectives for the forces included the airfield, the main downtown and embassy area, and a corridor between these two areas.⁸²

The rapid response of the US forces was adequate to protect US nationals in the city. The preponderant superiority of the US forces was also capable of quelling any organized enemy resistance within the Santo Domingo area. The strategic problem faced by the intervening forces, however, was how to deter conflict once on the ground, not how to win tactical engagements.

Ultimately, this deterrence rested on the facile coordination of the military intervention with other means of diplomacy. The rapid initiation of effective OAS participation in the peacekeeping force itself and the diplomatic negotiations to achieve a compromise government were critical in preventing the development of a protracted and violent occupation by US forces.

US capabilities were certainly adequate to meet the

anticipated military requirements of the intervention, unless the general disorder turned into a protracted guerilla war waged from remote areas of the island.

Tactical objectives and methods were appropriately chosen to implement the national strategy. Control of the airport and foreign sections of the city was vital in securing an LOC and in providing for the safety of foreign nationals. It should be emphasized that what made these objectives particularly desirable was that the US forces did not have to wage major operations to seize them by force. Had the US forces encountered heavy opposition at any point in the undertaking, the diplomatic factors upon which success hinged would have ruled against continuing the operations; the US would certainly have had difficulty in claiming to preserve stability if it had fought major battles in the intervention. Especially critical was the corridor which was maintained between the airfield and the International Zone. This corridor not only assured the unity of US forces but also separated the rebels into two sections of the city.

Most importantly, it should be noted that US forces did not undertake offensive actions unless directly fired upon and in immediate danger. On only one occasion did US forces take strong offensive action; this was in response to a direct attack by the rebels which inflicted casualties upon US forces manning defensive positions along the corridor. This strong action seemed to have a salutary effect on the progress of the negotiations.

US forces were further employed in humanitarian aid missions such as the distribution of food and medical aid. These tasks undoubtedly contributed to the diplomatic success of the operation.

In all, the intervention succeeded in coordinating military requirements with the fundamental aims of national policy. Strategy and tactical capabilities placed no restraint on the development of courses of action to support the fundamental diplomatic aims of the intervention. And these lower objectives were selected with the clear intent of supporting the diplomatic aims.

Assignment of comparative evaluations. The national objectives, situational constraints, military objectives and methods, and policy coordination factors were assigned evaluations as shown in Table IV-7 below.

Table IV-7

Comparative Evaluations - Dominican Republic

| Comparative Aspect | Evaluation Assigned | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| National objectives | | | | | | |
| -defend | . | . | . | . | . | ----- |
| -support/stabilize | . | . | . | . | . | primary |
| -coerce | . | . | . | . | . | secondary |
| -seize | . | . | . | . | . | ----- |
| Situational constraints | | | | | | |
| -location | . | . | . | . | . | moderate |
| -opposition | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -military capabilities of intervening state | . | . | . | . | . | low |
| -inconsistency of policies | . | . | . | . | . | moderate |
| -lack of public support | . | . | . | . | . | high |
| -risks of escalation | . | . | . | . | . | low |

Table IV-7 (continued)

| Comparative Aspect | Evaluation Assigned |
|--|---------------------|
| Military objectives and methods | |
| -lack of clarity of strategic objectives | low |
| -lack of coordination of tactical and strategic objectives | low |
| -economy of military power | low |
| -overt violence | moderate |
| -lack of political constraint. | low |
| Policy coordination factors | |
| -lack of independence of military effort | moderate |
| -constraint from international organizations | low |
| -lack of diplomatic communications with the opposition | moderate |
| -lack of moral/legal justifiability | high |

Notes - Chapter IV

¹James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War. Policy and Direction: The First Year. (Washington: US Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), p. 51.

²Ibid., pp. 65-66.

³The New York Times, 26 June 1950, p. 1.

⁴Schnabel, op.cit., p. 70.

⁵US, Department of Defense, Message Rad c56942, CINC FE to JCS, 30 June 1950, cited by Schnabel, op.cit., p. 78.

⁶The UN resolution of 7 July under which MacArthur operated was generally considered sufficient legal basis to enter North Korea. (Schnabel, op.cit., p. 178.) On 27 September MacArthur was given authority by the President through the JCS to conduct operations north of the 38th Parallel, but he was also warned that that authority should not be considered final since it might be modified in accordance with developments such as Soviet or Chinese intervention. However, Secretary of Defense Marshal told MacArthur, "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel." (Schnabel, op.cit., p. 183).

⁷President Truman's address to the nation on 1 September 1950, quoted in The New York Times, 2 September 1950, p. 4.

⁸Schnabel, op.cit., p. 331.

⁹In the 27 September message from JCS MacArthur was told, "Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces." (Schnabel, op.cit., p. 182).

¹⁰Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, National Strategic Concepts and the Changing Nature of Modern War, Implications of Recent Experience, Volume III (Washington: Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, 1966), p. 35.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Schnabel, op.cit., p. 178.

¹³Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, op.cit., p. 71.

¹⁴Leon T. Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis (Urbana, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 24.

¹⁵Terrence Robertson, Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy. (New York: Atheneum, 1965), pp. 49-50.

¹⁶Harold MacMillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp 99-100.

¹⁷Robertson, op.cit., p. 73.

¹⁸MacMillan, op.cit., pp 101-102.

¹⁹Robertson, op.cit., p.74.

²⁰The New York Times, 27 July 1956, p. 1.

²¹Convention of Constantinople, 29-October 1888, Article I, in The Suez Canal, A Selection of Documents Relating to the International Status of the Suez Canal and the Position of the Suez Canal Company (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1956), p. 49.

²²These arguments were extracted from Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Military Intervention: A Case Study Of Britain's Use of Force in the 1956 Suez Crisis (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1966), pp. 33-37.

²³The New York Times, 3 October 1956, p. 1.

²⁴Details of the planning process were taken from Andre Beaufre, The Suez Expedition, 1956, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 23-95.

²⁵John Connell, The Most Important Country (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1957), p. 224, cited by Haig, op.cit., p. 26.

²⁶Sir Edwin Robert, Report on Damage and Casualties in Port Said (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), p. 12, cited by Haig, op.cit., p. 27.

²⁷Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, op.cit., p. 81.

²⁸The New York Times, 31 July 1956, p. 3. Eden is quoted as having stated that, "No arrangements for the future of this great international waterway would be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government which could leave it in the unfettered control of a single power which could as events have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of national policy."

²⁹MacMillan, op.cit., pp 101-102.

³⁰Beaufre, op.cit., p. 51.

³¹Ibid., pp 51-58.

³²Beaufre, op.cit., p. 49.

³³Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, op.cit., p. 114.

³⁴The New York Times, 6 January 1957, p. 1.

³⁵Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, op.cit., p. 112.

³⁶The New York Times, 15 July 1958, p. 1.

³⁷This summary of event is the intervention is drawn primarily from Robert McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," US Naval Institute Proceedings, Volume 88 (October 1962), pp. 64-79. McClintock was the American Ambassador to Lebanon at the time of the crisis.

³⁸The New York Times, 16 July 1958, p. 1.

³⁹For an Army interpretation of the operation, see US, 24th Infantry Division, After Action Report-- Operation Grandios, 15-31 July, 1958 (Augsburg, Germany: Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division, 5 November 1958).

⁴⁰These were the tactical objectives of the Marine landings. When Army forces arrived they were kept as a reserve in the vicinity of the airport. See Sydney S. Wade, "Operation Bluebat," Marine Corps Gazette, July, 1959, pp 10-23. General Wade was the Commander US Marine Landing Forces.

⁴¹Research and Analysis Corporation, Show of Force Concepts (Washington, D.C.: Research and Analysis Corporation, 1969), p. 53.

⁴²Neville Brown, Strategic Mobility (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 93-94.

⁴³Ibid., pp 94-95.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 93-94.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, op.cit., p. 178.

⁴⁷This commitment rested on a protocol to the SEATO treaty. The commitment was reaffirmed by SEATO on several occasions and also unilaterally by the US. See, for example, The New York Times, 28 August 1959, p. 1.

⁴⁸On March 7, 1962, Secretary of State Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman issued a joint statement,

confirmed by the President and Marshal Sarit, that pledged US defense of Thailand on a bilateral basis. See The New York Times, 7 March 1962, p. 1.

⁴⁹See The New York Times, 29 March 1961, p. 1, for the SEATO resolution.

⁵⁰Research and Analysis Corporation, op.cit., pp. 60-67.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 61.

⁵²Ibid., p. 62.

⁵³Ibid. See also The New York Times, 18 May 1962, p. 1, for a statement by General Harkins on the missions of US forces.

⁵⁴For a discussion of this plan and its contents, see Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971), p. 69.

⁵⁵US, Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Washington: US GPO, 1971) IIA (Book 1), p. 36.

⁵⁶Ibid., IV A.1.(Book 1) p. A-21.

⁵⁷Ibid., IV B.1.(Book 2), p. 97.

⁵⁸This was OPLAN 34A, submitted by CINCPAC on 19 December 1963. See US, Department of Defense, op.cit., IV C2(a) (book 3), p. ix.

⁵⁹David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 411.

⁶⁰US, Department of Defense, op.cit., IV C2(c) (Book 4), p. v.

⁶¹Ibid., IV C3 (Book 4), p. 111.

⁶²Ibid., p. v.

⁶³The New York Times, 8 April 1965, p. 1.

⁶⁴US, Department of Defense, op.cit., IV C3, p. vii.

⁶⁵Ibid., IV C5 (Book 4), p. 1.

⁶⁶For a record of Presidential statements of the war in Vietnam, see US, Department of Defense, op.cit., IV A (Book 7) "Justification of the War, Public Statements."

⁶⁷Ibid., IV C3(c), (Book 4), pp. 12-14.

⁶⁸For example, Secretary of State Rusk stated in a Voice of America broadcast in February of 1964, "Now, North Vietnam is not going to be neutralized. It's going to remain a member of the Communist Camp." (US Department of State Bulletin, 2 March 1964, p. 333 cited by US, Department of Defense, op.cit., IV A (Book 7), p. D-3.

⁶⁹US, Department of Defense, op.cit., IV C3 (Book 4), p. 11.

⁷⁰In a February, 1965, memo to the President, Mr. Bundy stated that, "the primary target (of the bombing) is improving the situation in South Vietnam. The immediate critical targets are in the South, in the minds of the South Vietnamese and the VC Cadre.... It seems clear that there will be a sharp increase in optimism in the South." (Cited in US, Department of Defense, op.cit., IV C3 (Book 4), pp. 37-38.

⁷¹US, Department of Defense, op.cit., IV C3 (Book 4), pp. 40-41.

⁷²Ibid., IV C4 (Book 4), pp. 21-22.

⁷³Some analysts observed at the time that if the US hoped to encourage negotiations by bombing, then the preconditions for the negotiations would be, logically, to halt the bombing, after which the US would have to have another means to exert pressure on the North. See Halberstam, op.cit., pp. 356-357.

⁷⁴US, Department of Defense, op.cit., IV C5 (Book 4), pp. 8-10.

⁷⁵An early State Department study had been wholly pessimistic on the feasibility of coercing the North through bombing. (Halberstam, op.cit., pp. 355-358.)

⁷⁶US, Department of Defense, op.cit., IV C3, p.44.

⁷⁷See The New York Times, 30 April 1965, p. 1, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk's comments on Communist influence in the rebellion, The New York Times, 1 May 1965, p. 1.

⁷⁸See The New York Times, 29 April 1965, p. 1.

⁷⁹Ibid., 3 May 1965, p. 10.

⁸⁰Ibid., 29 April 1965, p. 14.

⁸¹Ibid., 3 May 1965, p. 10.

⁸²Bruce R. Palmer, "The Army in the Dominican Republic,"

Army Magazine, November, 1965, pp. 43-44.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter abstracts from the case studies developed in Chapter IV to present some conclusions regarding the utility of contingency forces and the general problems of political-military coordination. First the results of the various contingency operations are surveyed; next the characteristics of the operations are compared to determine those aspects significant in differentiating successes from failures; third, the future utility of contingency forces is examined using the basic methodology developed in Chapter III. Finally, some aspects of the methodology which warrant further consideration are noted.

The Utility of Contingency Forces

Conventional military interventions by contingency forces of Western powers have been a significant feature of international affairs since World War II. The contingency operations investigated here occupied eight of the sixteen years covered by this study.

The results of the contingency operations in achieving the national objectives of the intervening powers were mixed. The Korean intervention succeeded in retaining the southern portion of the Korean peninsula within the Western sphere of influence, in honoring a commitment to an ally,

and in implementing collective security arrangements. However, the same results could probably have been achieved considerably sooner and at less cost had military and foreign policy been more effectively coordinated. US intervention in Lebanon (and the simultaneous British intervention in Jordan) did deter additional intervention by Syria and reestablished political stability in Lebanon and Jordan. The credibility of US commitments was upheld. The US intervention in the Dominican Republic succeeded in restoring order to a chaotic situation, safeguarded American lives, and forestalled the immediate takeover by a leftist and possibly Communist-dominated regime.

On the other hand, British intervention in Suez in 1956 was a disastrous failure. Nasser was not forced out of office nor was British control over the Canal restored; British prestige in the Middle East received a severe setback. The repercussions of the failure to British foreign policy were severe, including a split with the US and public humiliation of Britain at the UN. Nor was the initial US contingency operation in Vietnam (1964-65) successful. Though the gradual escalation of US involvement there did provide possibly the only means of engaging US power in support of the South, the 1964-65 intervention failed to significantly aid the South Vietnamese, failed to compel North Vietnamese withdrawal from the war, and failed to demonstrate the inadequacy of the "Wars of National Liberation" strategy. Rather, it led to further increases in the American commitment and, temporarily, to an almost complete American takeover of the

war effort. It is probably too soon to assess the final impact and the final advantages and disadvantages of the Vietnam involvement, but it promises to have a profound and lasting effect on American policy.

Some interventions have been more difficult to assess. British intervention in Kuwait may or may not have been critical in deterring an Iraqi attack on that sheikhdom. Some presumption of success must probably be granted, however, in that the deployment honored the British commitment without provoking Iraqi aggression and was ended with beneficial rather than harmful effects for both Britain and Kuwait. Similarly difficult to assess is the impact of US deployment to Thailand in 1962. While the intervention failed to deter further attacks by the Pathet Lao in Laos, peace talks nevertheless began to make progress and nominal neutralization of the Laotian situation through the Geneva Conference of 1962 was effected. Thailand was not attacked. There is no indication that the US deployment was provocative or in any way harmed US interests, so the action must be considered at least partially successful.

Viewed in perspective, the contingency operations of the Western powers were an extremely important component of their national influence. Certainly the contingency forces were not the only means of projecting national power; nor were they independent of the other aspects of nations' foreign policies. Rather, they must be viewed as intrinsic elements in the larger pattern of international relations. The potential to protect, to humiliate, to destroy, to hurt,

which these contingency forces represented was different in form but not so different in intent from other means of bargaining through diplomacy, economic policies, and so forth. And the employments of these forces were directed at the larger diplomatic problems. Whether or not the domestic publics understood and supported their governments' altered appreciations of the uses of military power, policymakers in the West had achieved the Clausewitzian standard of war (and the threat of war) as integral parts of the processes of diplomacy.

While not every contingency operation was successful, many did achieve the basic national purposes for which they had been undertaken. In Korea, Lebanon, Kuwait, Thailand, and the Dominican Republic contingency forces succeeded in providing conditions in which the larger short-term diplomatic aims were attained. And it is impossible to assess directly the no doubt significant contribution of these forces, even short of their commitment, in retaining influence for the West in many of the peripheral areas.

But what features accounted for the successes of some operations and the failures of others? The answer cannot be found in the military aspects of the operations alone, for as the contingency operations were intrinsic to the fabric of international relations, so their successes were derivative from their effective integration into the overall patterns. These larger patterns of relationships, and the contributions of particular military operations and techniques, can best be understood by comparative examination of

the interventions in four general areas: the basic national objectives themselves, the several situational constraints impacting upon the intervening power, the military objectives and methods of the operation, and various aspects of policy coordination.

Comparative Analyses of Contingencies

To explain the factors associated with success or failure, the various contingencies will be compared within each of the four general areas by relating their success or failure to their comparative descriptive evaluations. Then the contingencies will be compared across the four general areas to highlight the significant aspect differentiating success from failure. Finally, the particular problems of political-military coordination of objectives and methods will be considered.

In every contingency operation analyzed the objectives of the intervening power seem to have involved one or more of the following factors: defense of an area, support or provision of stability to a friendly government, coercion of a hostile government or group, or seizure of terrain.

The interventions analyzed in Chapter IV may be described by their intent as shown on Table V-1 below.

Categorizing contingency operations by their objectives indicates that operations conducted to support friendly governments, stabilize political situations, or defend areas from attack have been more successful than attempts to coerce foreign governments or revolutionary groups or seize

torrain.

Table V-1
Intervention Objectives

| Intervention | Objectives | | | |
|---------------------------|------------|-------------------|-----------|---------|
| | Defend | Support/Stabilize | Coerce | Seize |
| (successful operations) | | | | |
| Korea | primary | secondary | tertiary | |
| Lebanon | secondary | primary | tertiary | |
| Kuwait | tertiary | secondary | primary | |
| Thailand | | secondary | primary | |
| Dominican Republic | | primary | secondary | |
| (unsuccessful operations) | | | | |
| Suez | | | secondary | primary |
| Vietnam (64-65) | tertiary | secondary | primary | |

The results of the operations may be somewhat surprising since these contingency forces have usually arrived trained and equipped for combat, and especially prepared for conventional military operations. Yet, only in Korea were contingency forces actually tasked to conduct a defense by actual combat. In the other operations military forces were deployed although the full range of their military capabilities was not utilized.

With Suez as the only example, the use of contin-

gency forces to conduct conventional military operations to seize and hold terrain seems to have been an ineffective use of national military power.

Some contingency operations which aimed to coerce the opposition into a settlement or cessation of conflict were successful; others were not. Explanations for the variances in the results are developed below.

A critical element in explaining success or failure of contingency operations may be the array of constraints which the situation itself imposes on the planning and execution of the operation. The evaluation of the contingency operation by the degrees of constraint is shown in Table V-2 below.

Not surprisingly, those operations which were conducted under high constraints tended to be unsuccessful. The Suez operation was highly constrained in every aspect investigated. Situational constraints were also significant in the Vietnam intervention in 1964-65. Successful operations, conversely, seemed to require more favorable circumstances.

Two constraints which appear to have been most significant in differentiating successful from unsuccessful operations are the location of the intervention and the risks of escalation. Contingency operations directed against established governments in their own territories constitute acts of war in which minor powers have many of the advantages; by mere persistence they can win; world opinion seems to side with smaller powers resisting aggression; and

Table V-2
Situational Constraints

| Contingency | Degree of Constraint Imposed By: | | | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|------------|--|---------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| | Location | Opposition | Military Capabilities of Intervening State | Inconsistency of Policies | Lack of Public Support | Risks of Escalation |
| (successful operations) | | | | | | |
| Korea | low | high | low | moderate | very low-high | high |
| Lebanon | moderate | low | low | low | low | low |
| Kuwait | moderate | moderate | low | low | low | low |
| Thailand | low | moderate | moderate | low | low | moderate |
| Dominican Republic | moderate | low | low | moderate | high | low |
| - - - - | | | | | | |
| (unsuccessful operations) | | | | | | |
| Suez | very high | high | high | high | very high | high |
| Vietnam | very high | high | low | low | high | high |

direct attack from without usually strengthened the political cohesion of threatened states. The risks of escalation also weigh asymmetrically against the larger powers; not only do they bear the direct onus for the intervention, but also, they carry the burden of an unemployable nuclear capability, useful in intimidating or provoking another nuclear power but not instrumental in the intervention against the minor power. In Suez the British-French operation provoked a nuclear threat from the Soviet Union which added to the diplomatic pressures operating against termination successful for the British and French. In Vietnam the potential for Chinese and Soviet counteraction was carefully assessed in determining the amount of coercive power which could be generated against the North. The presence of risks of escalation, far from operating in favor of the US and Britain in such interventions, thus operates against the long-term, subtle coercive diplomacy advocated by some of the theorists.

Two particular aspects of the situations which do not appear to have been critical are the opposition and the lack of public support at home. Despite high degrees of constraint from both factors, some contingency operations were successful. In both the Korean and the Thailand operation US power was committed against strong opponents yet succeeded; in the Dominican Republic intervention, lack of public support exerted a high degree of constraint, yet the operation was completed successfully. Given the right combination of circumstances, then, intervention even in the face of public opposition at home can be effective.

Central to the concept of intervention is the employment of the contingency forces themselves. The specific variables describing the military objectives and methods of the operations were developed in Chapter III. Table V-3 below indicates the comparative evaluation of these factors for each of the contingency operations.

The data in Table V-3 reveal several interesting characteristics of the military objectives and methods. First, no single factor provided sufficient differentiation of successes from failures. For example, in no operation was there a significant absence of political constraints; yet some operations succeeded, others did not. Obviously, the important point here is not that political constraints will exist, but rather that they must be appropriate to direct military operations to attain the national ends. In the Thailand intervention it would have been inappropriate for US forces to deploy into Laos and prepare an active defense to blunt the Pathet Lao, and it was also unnecessary: the very presence of US forces generated appropriate coercive pressures to attain US objectives without provoking escalation by the other side. On the other hand, similar attention to the diplomatic sensitivities of the opponents bore no success in the Vietnam intervention.

Many of the contingency operations succeeded with only a low degree of violence. And in the cases of Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, a low economy of military power seemed to go along with the absence of a high degree of violence. This may indicate that when a high degree of mili-

Table V-3
Military Objectives and Methods

| Contingency | Presumed Degree of Unfavorable Impact from: | | | | |
|---------------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|----------------|---|
| | Lack of Clarity of Strategic Military Objectives | Lack of Coordination of Tactical and Strategic Objectives | Economy of Military Power Employed | Overt Violence | Lack of Political Constraints on Military |
| (successful operations) | | | | | |
| Korea | high | moderate | high | high | moderate |
| Lebanon | low | low | low | low | low |
| Kuwait | low | high | high | low | moderate |
| Thailand | high | high | high | low | low |
| Dominican Republic | low | low | low | moderate | low |
| -- -- -- | | | | | |
| (unsuccessful operations) | | | | | |
| Suez | low | high | high | high | low |
| Vietnam | high | high | high | high | low |

tary power, relative to the opposition, is employed, military forces deter rather than provoke violence. This may at least partially invalidate the concept of carefully tailoring forces to avoid excessive strength, a concept elaborately developed by the limited war theorists and also most attractive to political decisionmakers. Note, however, that the converse of this implication does not hold: a relatively high economy of force (that is, a failure to deploy overwhelming military power) does not always stimulate a high degree of violence.

The hierarchical model of political-military decisionmaking, which was explained in Chapter III, would seem to imply that clear definition of strategic objectives and effective coordination of tactical with strategic objectives are prerequisites for successful applications of military power. The data of Table V-3 show this not to be the case. In both Korea and Thailand, some lack of clarity and coordination did not preclude successful operations. Failure to adhere to these proven military principles does not automatically spell failure; and as the Suez operation showed, clearly defined strategic objectives are certainly not sufficient to guarantee success.

A fourth and related aspect of contingency operations is the coordination of military operations with the other elements of foreign policy. Four factors of this coordination were described in Chapter III. Table V-4 below indicates the comparative evaluations of the contingency operations by these factors.

Table V-4
Policy Coordination Factors

| Contingency | Presumed Degree of Unfavorable Impact From: | | | |
|---------------------------|---|--|---|------------------------------------|
| | Lack of Independence of Military Effort | Constraints from International Organizations | Lack of Diplomatic Communications with Opposition | Lack of Moral/Legal Justifiability |
| (successful operations) | | | | |
| Korea | low | low | high | low |
| Lebanon | high | moderate | moderate | low |
| Kuwait | high | low | moderate | low |
| Thailand | high | low | low | moderate |
| Dominican Republic | moderate | low | moderate | high |
| -- -- -- -- | | | | |
| (unsuccessful operations) | | | | |
| Suez | moderate | high | moderate | high |
| Vietnam | high | low | high | moderate |

The data in Table V-4 indicate that in most contingency operations the military effort was highly dependent on the other elements of foreign policy, especially in securing the favorable termination of the operation. Except for the Korean intervention every successful contingency operation was associated with no more than a moderate lack of diplomatic communications with the opposition; that is, at least normal diplomatic relations or other readily available means of communication facilitated the articulation and bargaining surrounding the terms of termination. In the Korean operation, the means of diplomatic communications were eventually attained by the 1951 commencement of the peace talks. The absence of appropriate means of termination was sorely felt in the Vietnam contingency operation, when a military operation which had achieved some degree of tactical success could not be translated into desired political objectives.

Lack of support (in other words, constraints) from international organizations may or may not be significant factors in the successes of operations. The British intervention in Suez might have succeeded with Western, and especially with US, support in a host of international organizations; without that support, the intervention was doomed to fail. However, the US intervention in Vietnam did elicit support from SEATO allies, yet it was markedly unsuccessful.

The lack of moral or legal justifiability of interventions seem to be associated with their failure, except in the case of the Dominican Republic. Yet perhaps the key

point here was that the intervention was nonetheless justified before the Organization of American States, which provided the peacekeeping forces and diplomatic assistance to enable the US to terminate its intervention successfully.

Different aspects of the interventions assume significance if they are compared across factor categories. Table V-5 below is a composite comparison of the contingency operations, showing all the aspects and the evaluations assigned each operation for each aspect.

Four of the interventions had primary objectives of coercion or seizure. The failures (Suez and Vietnam) were differentiated from the successes (Kuwait and Thailand) by high overt violence and high situational constraints derived from the location, opposition, and high risks of escalation. The failures also lacked public support and showed a moderate or high lack of diplomatic communications with the opposition. However, there were not significant differences in the other characteristics of military objectives and methods such as the lack of clarity of strategic objectives, lack of coordination of tactics and strategy, and economy of military power. In other words, situational factors and, in the case of Vietnam, the lack of communications with the opposition, seemed more responsible for the outcomes than the military aspects per se. Military success at the tactical level was not a sufficient condition for diplomatic success. It should be noted, though, that successful generation of some sort of military threat was a necessary condition to the successes achieved.

Table V-5
Comparative Evaluations Summary

| Comparative Aspect | Contingency Evaluation | | | | | | |
|---|------------------------|-----------|----------|----------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | Suez | Vietnam | Kuwait | Thailand | Lebanon | Dominican Republic | Korea |
| Successful | no | no | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Primary National Objective | seize | coerce | coerce | coerce | support/stabilize | support/stabilize | defend |
| Situational Constraints | | | | | | | |
| -location | very high | very high | moderate | low | moderate | moderate | low |
| -opposition | high | high | moderate | moderate | low | low | high |
| -military capability of intervening state | high | low | low | moderate | low | low | low |
| -inconsistency of policies | high | low | low | low | low | moderate | moderate |
| -lack of public support | very high | high | low | low | low | high | very low-high |
| -risks of escalation | high | high | low | moderate | low | low | high |

Military Objectives and Methods

| | | | | | | |
|--|------|------|----------|------|----------|----------|
| -lack of clarity of strategic objectives | low | high | low | high | low | high |
| -lack of coordination of tactical and strategic objectives | high | high | high | high | low | high |
| -economy of military power employed | high | high | high | high | low | high |
| -overt violence | high | high | low | low | moderate | high |
| -lack of political constraints | low | low | moderate | low | low | moderate |

Policy Coordination Factors

| | | | | | | |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|------|
| -lack of independence of military efforts | moderate | high | high | high | moderate | low |
| -constraint from international organizations | high | low | low | low | moderate | low |
| -lack of diplomatic communications | moderate | high | moderate | low | moderate | high |
| -with opposition | high | moderate | low | moderate | high | low |
| -lack of moral/legal justifiability | high | moderate | low | moderate | low | low |

Two interventions had primary objectives of supporting a friendly government or stabilizing a political situation within a country; both the Lebanon and the Dominican Republic operations achieved their objectives. The situational constraints were similar except for a much greater lack of public support in the Dominican intervention and a somewhat more inconsistent policy there. In the Dominican Republic operation more violence occurred than in the Lebanon intervention; the most striking differences, however, were in the policy coordination factors. The data in Table V-5 suggest the common modality of success in both operations was the overwhelming, well-coordinated application of military power in a low-risk operation in a neutral or Western-oriented country against a poorly equipped or organized opposition. In either operation poorly coordinated or insufficient military power could have led to failure. While the US forces presented a clear military challenge to the opposition within each of the countries, an element of diplomatic threat was also present in both cases as foreign powers supporting the disorders were themselves deterred from further involvement.

The Korean intervention was the only one of the seven whose primary purpose was defense. Though the operation was basically successful, that success could have been achieved much more efficiently. Lack of clarity of strategic military objectives significantly impaired the attainment of national purposes. By its very nature the success of the operation in Korea was dependent primarily on the

success of American arms; and, given the lack of overwhelming military power which the US employed, military victories required careful coordination, sometimes lacking, and a long struggle with high casualties.

The data in Table V-5 suggest that the significance of the military aspects of the operations has varied markedly. In Kuwait and Thailand military operations seemed critical only to emphasize the seriousness of great power concern and commitment. Had conflict occurred in either operation, the deployed forces would have had great difficulty in achieving military successes on the battlefield. In other cases, however, the effectiveness of military operations, not just a military presence, provided the clear differences between successes and failures. The attainment of national objectives in Korea, Lebanon, and the Dominican Republic was highly dependent on the tactical effectiveness of the military forces employed. But in Suez and in Vietnam success at the tactical level did not produce strategic and national success. It would be tempting but altogether sophistic to conclude that successful military operations are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for successful intervention.

The significance of the military aspects of the operations cannot be grasped by easy philosophical formulae. The root issue which must be faced in determining the proper military role is the proper coordination of military means with political ends. And there seems little doubt that the two are, to some extent, incompatible.

The basic principles of political science and the characteristics of the American polity have directed that the US use force only as a last resort in coping with international problems; further, if force had to be used, it was to be used in as small doses as possible. In any use of force the risks of escalation should be minimized. For a variety of reasons it seemed that the way to limit the risks of escalation was to employ force gradually, in distinct phases, taking care to upset neither the public nor the opposition's crisis managers.

Yet many of the above considerations have been incompatible with good military sense. The military exists as an organization to employ force; it has focussed on "threats" which are normally the forces of the opponent; it has sought to maximize "shock effect" to destroy those threats. It has sought specific, directive objectives to be attained through rapid and violent execution of orders.

The fundamental problem of political-military coordination, then, has been to determine how far down the hierarchy of decisionmakers (explained in Chapter III) political considerations should prevail over military considerations. When may the general demand that a President widen the scope of a war? When may the President direct the positioning of a single squad? General answers to such a fundamental problem are difficult, but the contingencies analyzed above suggest several factors which must be taken into account.

Consider first interventions whose primary purpose is active defense. Obviously, operations directed toward

military defense have to be more concerned with basic military requirements such as security, mass, unity of command, and so forth, than interventions which do not entail conventional combat. Because these operations are overtly defensive well-coordinated, militarily-effective operations will be a necessary and perhaps even sufficient condition for conflict termination. And their very purpose seems to preclude adverse situational constraint from the location and policy coordination difficulties stemming from a lack of moral or legal justifiability. The basic factor in successful policy coordination may well be the perception of successful military actions. Thus, within the basic national aim, military commanders must be given full scope for tactical and strategic success.

On the other hand, interventions whose purpose is to support friendly governments or stabilize political situations have quite justifiably had to accept a high degree of constraint, down to the lowest tactical levels. Such operations are intrinsically civil-military in nature and seem to work best when the shock effect of military power can be exerted in coordination with civil and international law and without reliance on overt violence. Typically, troops must be given tactical objectives to secure their own lines of communication and/or protect vital facilities without which civil chaos will ensue, but carefully prescribed tactics and rules of engagement must necessarily be followed. The desirability of any particular objective will often be in inverse proportion to the violence necessary to effect

its seizure. Considerations of security may often have to yield to respect for the rights and customs of the populace. At every level the political and diplomatic impact of military actions must be carefully considered in military decisionmaking.

Taken in perspective, the results do suggest that the US and Britain, and US and British forces, have been successful in coordinating military requirements and political necessities in contingency operations aimed to defend, support, or stabilize. The hierarchical, rational decision-making procedures have by and large functioned smoothly, and military forces have been of sufficient strength and mobility to accomplish the required tasks. Though errors and near-errors did occur in the operations, these errors seemed to result not from doctrinal inadequacies but from errors in individual judgment.

But in coercive military actions and military seizures of terrain, insurmountable problems derived from the fundamental tension of military methods and political objectives have appeared. Situational constraints may be very high and nearly irreconcilable. The strength of the opposition may seem to require strong military power, but, as in Vietnam, the risks of escalation may dictate a more prudent, gradualist policy. Lack of public support may suggest rapid action which can be terminated before active domestic political opposition can be aroused, but the weight of previous conciliatory policies may present an inertia difficult to overcome. Coercive military actions by a democratic

state may also face severe policy coordination problems. The specific national purposes of the contingency operation may conflict with the attainment of other goals. And war against a smaller state generates asymmetric pressures against the intervening power which, whatever the original justifications for its actions, will arouse diplomatic constraints from international organizations and erode its overall legal/moral standing in world affairs.

Thus, while the Western powers have engaged in coercive deployments, they have, at least after Suez, become very wary of committing forces actively into combat. They have instead sought a policy of deliberate ambiguity extolled by the diplomatic theorists. Its purpose was to threaten decisive military action without provoking or suffering through it. This strategy of deliberate ambiguity, which came to be known as graduated response, was successful in interventions in both Kuwait and Thailand. But in the ambiguity lay the danger of over extension and protracted conflict; once involved in the bluffing and brinkmanship of coercive deployments, accidents or absence of policy alternatives would push the deployed forces into actual combat. The careful tailoring and high degree of political constraint which may have been effective in guiding a demonstration of national power without violence would then restrain the effective application of military power through military violence.

Certainly there is no easy way to avoid the difficulties of the political-military dichotomy in such opera-

tions. Yet some guidelines do emerge from the cases examined above. First, the opportunities to succeed at low cost through diplomatic bargaining supported by coercive deployments, as in Thailand and Kuwait, have existed. These examples confirm the feasibility of coercive diplomacy under the right conditions and justify consideration of military deployments whose primary capabilities are limited to demonstrations of national concern. Thus military leaders are not justified in arguing against political constraints intrinsic to such deployments under those conditions.

But, second, once military forces are committed to actual operations requiring military violence, military leaders have been overly cautious in resisting and political leaders overly effective in imposing political constraints which have reduced the military impact of coercive measures. In Vietnam much more destructive measures could probably have been employed against the North Vietnamese without increasing appreciably the risks of escalation. Whether these would have produced more coercion, and hence more success, can never be known, of course. But it is clear that, once committed to actual combat, anything less than overwhelming and rapid military success for the intervening power will be diplomatically disastrous.

Important timing problems must be considered in coercive operations, also. Rapid response militarily may generate more coercive pressures by improving the effectiveness of military operations through shock effect and surprise, but this effectiveness must be purchased at the cost of high

risks of escalation if the military action is not decisive. Responses chronologically linked to the proscribed actions of the opposition may generate less coercive pressure but more public support than military operations which seize the initiative from the enemy. But again, once diplomatic coercion is to be implemented by military conflict, military principles must be given greater priority. While this conclusion is far from a comprehensive doctrine of coercive warfare, it nevertheless suggests a decisive shift toward adherence to fundamental military principles once coercive operations have escalated to overt violence.

Looking Ahead

As for the future, will contingency operations remain a viable mission for US forces? If so, how should these forces be structured and equipped?

Since the 1965 time-frame at which this investigation stopped, momentous and still accelerating changes in the international, domestic, and military situations have occurred. These changes will have significant impact on the viability of future contingency missions. First, situational constraints have changed dramatically. The system of alliances and agreements which the US established as the legal and military buttresses of containment has gradually dissolved. No clear structure has emerged in its place, despite brave notions of the European Community, Trilateralism, and so forth. Meanwhile, the prevailing tilt of international politics, perhaps influenced more by a socialist

than a communist ideology, has grown more hostile. The number and commitment of US client states has shrunk, and nationalism has become an even more potent force in world affairs. The result is fewer potential areas of intervention at the request of friendly governments. Many of the newly developing nations hostile or uncommitted to the US have become much better organized and equipped militarily over the past ten years. Increased Soviet contingency forces impose a greater risk of escalation through Soviet counterintervention, at least outside the Western Hemisphere. British foreign policy since 1966 has moved progressively against any inclination to intervene. US policy in the past ten years has been ambiguous regarding intervention; detente, the Nixon Doctrine, the prolonged involvement in Vietnam, the last coercion of the North in December, 1972, the War Powers Resolution, cutbacks in military forces, and the final tragedies in Southeast Asia have cast a pall of irresolution and uncertainty over future policies. The apparent unwillingness of the American public to bear the costs of international commitments imposes additional constraint.

Within those situational restrictions military forces will face new difficulties in contingency operations. Given the residual ambivalence of American foreign policy, a residue which has perhaps affected the American military almost as much as it has affected the Department of State, Congress, or the public, obtaining clear and well-defined strategic military objectives will probably be more difficult than in the past. Though British forces have been...

back, US forces have improved their strategic mobility, their firepower, and their readiness. Still, the worldwide proliferation of increasingly sophisticated arms will reduce the military dominance which these contingency forces can provide.

Finally, the coordination of military with diplomatic actions in contingency operations will likely prove more difficult in the future. One of the legacies of the Vietnam commitment has been the alienation of the US from the diplomatic support of its allies and the UN on many issues. As the October, 1973, Middle East crisis showed, this alienation may well be long term. Moreover, with the lingering controversy over the US failure in Vietnam, any intervention seems prima facie more difficult to justify. The US has sought to improve the balance of its policy coordination factors by developing improved relations with China and the Soviet Union, through the many negotiations of detente such as SALT and MBFR, and through other aspects of personal diplomacy. Overall, however, the policy coordination factors seem less favorable today than ten years ago.

None of the foregoing argues that US diplomats will not see a need to intervene in the peripheral areas at some future time. Indeed, the instability and increased American involvement in the Middle East seem likely to generate repeated pressures for such intervention. And rapidly expanding Soviet intervention capabilities may someday require a US counterintervention or pre-emptive intervention. What appears more disturbing is that the increased constraints on

US interventions - situational, military, and policy coordination - will make future interventions more risky, more difficult to coordinate, and perhaps less likely to succeed. And in the final analysis, only successful interventions are useful.

Within these increased constraints, military forces will require an unprecedented degree of readiness and mobility. Reliance on air and naval forces is unlikely to prove wholly satisfactory. Because the employment of these forces has a degree of reversability not possible with land forces, they provide only a limited degree of diplomatic commitment. In the aftermath of Southeast Asia, that degree of commitment will be markedly less persuasive than in the past. Moreover, there may arise situations in which the firepower and presence these forces provide are simply inappropriate for the tasks required.

In some interventions a few thousand airborne troops with reinforcing airpower and heavy weapons may constitute an effective stabilizing element in an otherwise chaotic situation. But when the intervention involves intimidation or actual combat with a hostile state, these light forces, even well supported, may be inadequate. Against a numerically superior, well trained, and heavily armed enemy forces these light forces will lack battlefield survivability. Their air support will be vulnerable to interdiction as well; and their mobility on the battlefield will be severely constrained. Their dispatch will but serve to insure American involvement in an ugly situation. Yet, given the complexity of

generally unfavorable constraints on American intervention, especially the notable lack of public support, initial military defeats will hardly be the means to insure eventual diplomatic success. Contingency forces which are heavily armored and highly mobile through strategic airlift will be a necessity in contingencies entailing mid-intensity combat.

Once committed into combat operations against non-great power forces, these units will have to conduct vigorous military operations aimed at proper military objectives. The accomplishment of these objectives should insure that the opposition has no chance to provoke a protracted campaign which exposes the vulnerabilities of the American political process. Rapid and decisive operations may also be the best guarantor against Soviet counterintervention in such contingencies. Only when these contingency forces have obtained a military situation in which the opposition perceives that it has no military recourse can the diplomatic ends be attained.

Finally, it should be noted that these characteristics for contingency operations will greatly restrict the applicability of the threats of intervention which have provided easy leverage for American foreign policy. To defend American interests will require a real political commitment to protect them by force of arms.

In sum, military contingency operations have been useful in the past and potential requirements for contingency operations will appear in the future. But these contingency forces will need to be more heavily equipped and

deployable than in the past. And even with the increased capabilities of these forces, the many constraints which have developed will make interventions abroad more difficult to implement successfully. At a time of budgetary restraint and foreign policy reassessments, hard choices of national priorities lie ahead for America if we are to retain the capacity to intervene abroad.

Directions for Further Research

Two methodological techniques developed in this thesis deserve further development. First, the hierarchical decisionmaking model must be more fully explored. If this model is accurate, it certainly prescribes the need for military commanders at all levels to understand the national and strategic aims and methods if they are to conduct proper mission analysis and correctly employ their resources. But how ought the higher level aims and constraints be transmitted downwards? How should officers be taught the general conceptual foundations necessary to interpret these higher level concerns? If officers can become more integrated into the political process of goal definition through such studies, what is the likely impact on the overall nature of American civil-military relations to be? The model seems to provide a fundamental tool for explaining and investigating the military role in the foreign policy process which has not yet been fully developed.

A second area of exploration is the set of comparative evaluations which were developed in Chapter III.

seems likely that this set of factors may be useful in evaluating other contingency operations. For example, the same general categories might be appropriate to describe contingency operations in the Fifth Century B.C. or the framework could be useful in interpreting political-military operations such as brinkmanship against the Soviets or regional wars not involving Western powers. While each of the descriptive factors is necessarily highly general, the overall framework does provide what may be a useful means for classifying and comparing a broad spectrum of political military operations.

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